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INTRODUCTION 
The air cargo industry is presently in its lnfancy with the largest growth 
yet to come. During this future growth there wl11 be many lnstitutiona1, opera-
tlona1 and equipment changes. To bring about these changes lnte111gent1y and 
effectively will requlre long range analysis and planning that is more advanced 
and more comprehensive than anything that has been done in the past. The NASA 
CLASS represents the lnltia1 assu1t on these future oriented efforts. 
The basic Douglas CLASS was begun in June 1977 and completed in May 1978. 
A follow-on effort, dlrected to the definition of freighter aircraft require-
ments to the year 2008, was lnltlated in October of 1978 and completed in 
August 1979. It can be noted here that the alr cargo lndustry was deregulated 
durlng 1977. The impact of thlS legislation is not reported in detal1 ln the 
CLASS reports, discusslons are generally maintained as written prior to the 
1egls1atlon. ThlS approach was taken due to the short observation time 
available during the contract. 
ThlS volume of the Douglas CLASS final report briefly summarizes the 1700 
pages of flndings and conclusions derlved during the total study as reported 
ln the fo110wlng four volumes: 
• Volume I - Ana1ysls of Current Air Cargo Systems, NASA CR158912 
• Volume II - Case Study Approach and Results, NASA CR158913 
• Volume III - Cross Impact Between the 1990 Market and the 
(2 Books) Alr Physical Distribution Systems, NASA CR158914 
• Volume IV - Future Requirements of Dedicated Freighter Alrcraft 
to Year 2008, NASA CR158950 
These results represent the stepplng off point for the much needed coordinated 
future planning efforts by government agencies, the airlines, the users and 
the aircraft manufacturers. 
The methodology utilized ln the investigations is schematically shown in 
the following dlagram. The analysis of the current system encompassed eva1ua-
tlons of the past and current cargo markets and on-sight surveys of airports 
and cargo termlna1s. The findings that resulted provided the basis for formu-
lating the case study procedures, developing the future scenario, and develop-
ing the future cargo market demand. 
III 
, ' 
Analys1s 
Formulate of 
1990 Advanced Scenario ~ System Analysis 
of Case ~ 1 Current Studies 
System Cargo Define 
4 Market New Demand Fre1ghter 
Forecast Requirements 
Rather than assume a scenario, as often done, it was developed dur1ng the 
course of the 1nvest1gations mak1ng full use of the find1ngs derived from the 
case studies, the market forecast1ng effort and the advanced system analysis. 
The latter encompassed the 1dent1f1cation and evaluat10n of the 1nterrelat1ons 
between system development and cargo market growth. The resulting market 
demand along with the future air cargo infrastructure character1stics and 
requirements were then ut1lized in developing the requ1rements for future 
freighter a1rcraft. 
Contents of this volume are categorized under five sect1ons. The multi-
pl1C1ty of subjects encompassed in each of these sections are d1scussed 1n 
terms of the past, present and future, thus providing a sequental view of past 
performance and alternatives for the future. These alternatives represent 
poss1ble courses of action that have the potential to improve system effective-
ness, decrease costs, and increase the air cargo market demand. These courses 
of action were derived w1th due cons1derat1on for the influenc1ng pol1t1cal, 
econom1C, physical and compet1t1ve factors along with the des1res and require-
ments of the a1r cargo user as 1dent1fied 1n the case studies. It should be 
noted that the CLASS concentrated on all-cargo a1rcraft, the1r operation and 
associated lnfrastructure. 
The Douglas Aircraft Company is pleased to acknowledge the excellent 
contributions made to this study by personnel of the F1Y1ng T1ger L1ne that 
part1cipated as the subcontractor on specific study tasks. In addition, 
appreciat10n is expressed to the NASA contract mon1tor Lt. Col. John Vaughn, 
Ret1red, for h1S keen interest and support dur1ng the course of the contract. 
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FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
As the future unfolds 1t w1ll be necessary to adJust our cargo operat1ons 
and to progress1vely t~llor 1tS infrastructure and aircraft to the grow1ng 
cargo demand as affected by changes in the total enVlronment. From the volumes 
of data and results developed 1n the CLASS the follow1ng 1tems were selected 
as appropr1ate slgnposts for d1rected progress. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Current Find1ngs 
U.s. Domest1c fre1ght 1S dom1nated by the truck1ng 1ndustry due not 
only to the1r lower tar1ffs but also to level of service they-provide. 
The maJor port1on of domest1c fre1ght movement is intrareg10nal and 
1S carried by surface transport over average hauls of about 450 
k1lometers (279.7 statute m1les) for trucks. Only 0.3 percent of the 
1nterreglonal movement 1S by a1r. 
There are large quant1ties of commod1t1es moving by sea whose product 
value 1ndicates that they are a1r el1gible. 
There will be few surpr1ses 1n the future products sh1pped by a1r 
w1th llttle change in the average warehouse dens1ty of high value 
bulk or processed goods. Commod1ties in the top 20 sh1pped by a1r 
w1ll Sh1ft w1th a cont1nued 1ncrease in the percent of manufactured 
goods making up the total freight movement. In constant dollars, 
the value threshold (dollars/k1logram) of a1r el1gib1l1ty w1ll 
decrease. 
Wh1le airfreight 1S currently a small shipment industry the a1rl1nes 
must cult1vate large shipments on a regular basis to realize the1r 
growth expectat1ons. 
Most of todays maJor a1rports are incompat1ble w1th w1ng span, 
fuselage length, and flotat1on character1st1cs larger than the B747F 
and are limited in expansion due to env1ronmental constraints and/or 
land availabil1ty. 
The changes 1n market demand that can result from a +10 percent 
change in casual var1ables were determ1ned as follows. 
Casual Var1ables 
GNP 
A1r Cargo Tariffs 
DellVery T1me 
Cit1es Served 
Truck Tanffs 
Change 1 n 
XVII 
Market Demand 
22 
-13 
-3 
1.5 
1 
( %) 
• Operating at 70 to 80 percent capacity and constra1ned in expanS10n 
by land available, most a1r cargo terminals w1ll requ1re 1ncreased 
mechanization and container1zat1on, and revised handling procedures 
to meet the 1990 flow levels. These improvements will also reduce 
the air terminal costs which are currently three t1mes those for 
truck terminals. 
• Due to the wide variation in package size and we1ght, fully automated 
sorting will rema1n uneconomical for some time into the future. 
Users Des1res 
• SerV1ce 1S the prime consideration for uS1ng air cargo followed by 
cost. The concensus among shippers 1ndicated that a 30 percent 
reduction in air tariffs would not in itself cause them to increase 
their use of air cargo. Similarly, ability to self load containers 
would not 1ncrease their use of a1rfreight. 
• The choice between air and surface modes is made on the basis of 
total serV1ce. Sh1ppers felt that the biggest airfreight problems 
are those assoc1ated with ground support handl1ng (airport congestion, 
pickup and delivery, operat1onal procedures, customer service, etc.) 
rather than the airport-to-airport segment. 
• Mode cho1ce should consider the cost/benefit tradeoffs 1n the frame-
work of the shipper's total production system. The analysis must 
consider both the qualatative and quantitative ~actors since the former 
can ident1fy potential benef1ts that are becom1ng 1ncreasingly 
1mportant in todays competitive markets. 
• Shippers consider door-to-door single carrier responsibility, slngle 
tariffs, and intermodal capab1l1ty to be necessary elements in the 
future transportation system. The number of forwarders will decrease 
and the surV1vors will increase their scope of operation to prov1de 
worldwide forwarding services. Shippers were in favor of the airlines 
performing this service. 
• There is need for the airlines and forwarders to educate shippers on 
the total distribution concept in a manner that does not appear 
self-serving. 
Near Future - The 80's 
• The future development of the air cargo industry, its operations, 
1nfrastructure and equipment could be more seriously handicapped 
by institutional road blocks than by technology. 
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The average annual compounded growth rates for the all-cargo aircraft 
portions of the a1r cargo market are forecast to be 8.6 percent for 
U.S. Domestic, 7.9 percent for U.S. International and 12 percent 
for the Foreign market during the period 1978 through 2008. The 
combined growth rate for the three markets is 10.7 percent. 
The U.S. Domestic air cargo demand w1ll have its largest growth in 
the South and Southwest. The largest international growth will occur 
1n the underdeveloped regions, primarily South America, West-Central 
Africa, parts of the M1ddle East, and the Far East including mainland 
China. Foreign airlines will capture the major portion of the growth 
in these reglons. 
While fuel cost and availability will be among the determining 
factors in future air cargo system growth their 1mpact on 1ntermodal 
competitiveness cannot be viewed in isolat1on but must be considered 
relative to concurrent changes in technology, wages and the avail-
ability and cost of money, and the relative intensities of these 
costs w1thin the respect1ve modes. 
As we proceed toward the turn of the century the competitiveness of 
air will increase relative to trucks and ships but decrease relative 
to rail. 
Construction of new metropolitan airports during the 80's is unlikely. 
Many major hubs w1ll encounter runway saturat10n although this can be 
delayed by the installation of advanced air traff1c control systems. 
There will be a proliferation of curfews and operators will encounter 
increasing airs ide delays due to flow control and night operating 
restrictions. 
System congestion may be relieved by increasing the number of d1rect 
flights; developing many small hubs in preference to a few super hubs; 
establishing cargo operations at general aviation airports, ut1lizing 
surplus military bases and/or through Joint use of military a1rports. 
Customer loaded conta1ners (CLC's) and/or off airport consol1dation 
is the most effective means of increasing airport term1nal product1vity 
and decreasing costs. 
A point of diminishing returns on manpower reduction is reached once 
the terminals' funct10nal operations are mechanized, however, additional 
mechanization will increase term1nal capacity. 
Multiple level storage and queuing, utilizing current technology and 
elevating transport vehicles, combined with 90 percent CLC's and a 
reduction of the average import storage time from 3 to It days, can 
reduce manpower and terminal equipment costs by 65 and 35 percent 
respectively. 
The progress1ve development of terminals and aircraft will cu~m1nate 
in mechanized 2.4x2.4x6 meter (8x8x20 foot) M2 conta1ner term1nals. 
Encompassing computerized document management these term1nals will be 
cost effective on a weight flow basis. 
• The growing use of containers and intermodal operations will stimulate 
new container des1gns, including modular configurations for inter and 
intraline transfer, that el1minate the slave pallet and in add1tion 
prov1de 30 percent reductions in cost and tare weight compared to 
current mar1time intermodal conta1ners. 
• The increased volume and select1vity of shipments assoc1ated with the 
growing market demand w1ll facilitate increasing container volumetric 
ut1lizat1on from the current average 54 percent to 85 to 90 percent 
and will also increase aircraft load factors from current 65 to 70 
percent. The latter can reduce direct operating cost (DOC) by at least 
7 percent. 
• The hub-spoke concept has the potential to substantially reduce, or 
elim1nate, the current backhaul problems in international operations. 
Acceptance of this concept would place increased emphasis on larger 
a1rcraft and all-cargo airports, however, these approaches w1ll be 
handicapped by institutional barriers. 
• Future terminal and on-board a1rcraft systems w1ll provide 1ntermixed 
handling of a1r and marit1me containers w1th a substant1al reduction 
in 10ad1ng manpower. 
• Improvements in ground handling operations and equ1pment comb1ned 
with increasing fuel cost w1ll substant1ally reduce the importance 
of ind1rect operating costs (IOC) as an element of the total operat-
ing cost (TOC) thus placing increasing emphasis on a1rcraft technology 
and utilization. 
• The 1nvestment related components (deprec1ation and 1nsurance) of the 
aircraft DOC have the potential to offset the cost reductions realized 
from advanced technology. 
• A modified air cargo system incorporating 1mproved mechanized term1nals 
with reduced storage t1me; 90 percent sh1pper-loaded containers; and 
an advanced technology freighter operating at 70 percent load factor 
and with improved airport compat1bility; could realize a 21 to 24 per-
cent reduction in tar1ffs and a four percent increase in a1rl1ne 
profits after 10 years of operation. At the end of this period the 
new fre1ghter would be handling about 45 percent of the cargo market 
demand. 
• The reductions 1n TOC achieved by infrastructure improvements ut1liz-
1ng 1980 technology are as important as the reductions ach1evable 
w1th 1990 aircraft technology. 
• The future trend will be toward tariff stab1lity while 1mprov1ng the 
return on investment and 1ncreasing prof1t. Incentive tar1ffs w1ll 
be employed to increase CLC's, container/volumetr1c utilizat1on, and 
aircraft load factors. 
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• In the absence of new, more efficient, derivative aircraft the number 
of current, small narrow-body aircraft (DC-9F, B737F) could increase 
20 percent before phasing out in the early 80's. The number of large 
narrow-body aircraft (DC-8F, B707F) could increase 60 percent reaching 
a maximum in the m1d 80's, however, a portion of this demand 1S being 
met by DC-10 and B747 combi-aircraft. The number of large wide-body 
aircraft (B747F, DC-10F) could increase to 400 units by 1992 with 
fleet operations (trips) increasing at an average annual rate of about 
7 percent. 
• The combined development of short and long range, 3219 and 7025 kilo-
meters (2000 and 4365 statute miles) respectively,lmproved technology 
derivative cargo aircraft would be economically desirable for the 
post 1985 time period. With payloads in the range of 91 to 149.7 
tonnes (100 to 165 tons) these derivative aircraft would increase the 
airline return on investment (ROI) four percentage points and reduce 
the airlines required investment 20 percent relative to a comparable 
fleet of current aircraft. 386 of these aircraft would be reqired by 
1998. The number of current wide-bodies would increase to about 150 
units before beg1nning to be replaced by the derivat1ves in late 80's. 
• In the presence of two or more aircraft manufacturers a considerable 
number of passenger versions of the derivat1ve aircraft would have to 
be sold to realize a reasonable ROI for the manufacturers, a necessary 
condition to the in1tiation of a dedicated freighter program for the 
post-1995 time per1od. 
• The exterior dimensions of the conventionally configured 149.7 tonne 
(165 ton) payload aircraft are near the lim1t1ng values compatible 
with current hub airports. However, these larger derivat1ve aircraft 
could contain the fleet average annual frequency growth to 4 percent 
compared to 6.4 percent for the fleet of current aircraft. 
Far Future - The 90's and Beyond 
• The lower investment related costs of the derivative aircraft tended 
to negate the cost benefits of the 1990 technology in the dedicated 
fre1ghter. This behavior, 1n comb1nation with the lack of a passenger 
version, forced the preferred dedicated freighter to smaller payloads 
in order to increase the production run and thus reduce the unit price. 
• With one manufacturer the economically preferred long range, 68 tonne 
(75 ton) payload dedicated freighter was clearly des1rable increasing 
the airl1ne ROI four percentage points and reducing the airline invest-
ment by 18 percent compared to the reference fleet Of current and 
derivative aircraft. However, for the more real1st1c case of two 
manufacturers these economic improveme~ts wer~ reduceq by a factor . 
of four thus placing the dedicated fre1ghter 1n a pos1t1on of quest1on-
able econom1C value. 
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• Based upon two manufacturers each reallzlng a 15 percent ROI, the 
economically preferred dedicated freighter program for the post 1995 
time period was a comblnatlon of short and long range alrcraft having 
payloads of 45.4 tonne (50 ton) and 68.0 tonne (75 ton) respectively. 
The value of thlS program was considered marginal S1nce it increased 
the alrllne ROI only two percentage pOlnts and decreased their lnvest-
ment by 7 percent relative to the reference fleet of current and 
derivatlve aircraft. Increasing the payload size resulted in a further 
degradatl0n of the alrllne economics. 
• The number of economically preferred 45.4 and 68.0 tonne (50 ton and 
75 ton) payload dedicated frelghters lncreased to 949 short range and 
623 long range unlts by the year 2008. The result was a fleet annual 
frequency growth rate of 12.6 percent, nearly tWlce that of the 
reference fleet of current and derivative aircraft. This lncrease ln 
operations is considered a disadvantage since lt could provlde a 
serious confllct wlth proJected airport capacities. 
• Followlng introductlon of the dedicated freighters 1n 1995 the number 
of der1vat1ves would rema1n at about 248 units until the late 90's 
when they would begin be1ng replaced. 
• W1th a cargo market demand less than forecast the derlvat1ve and 
ded1cated a1rcraft would be less compet1t1ve against the current 
wlde-bod1es and the undesirable economlC effects would be greater 
wlth the dedicated freighter in the fleet. 
• Cons1derlng the econom1C performance of the dedicated fre1ghter program 
1t 1S clear that manufacturers would be reluctant to in1tlate ltS 
development (In preference to a program of cont1nued 1mprovement of 
the der1vative alrcraft) unless stimulated by the CiV1l passenger or 
m1l1tary a1rl1ft sectors and/or by partial SUbS1dy of the research, 
development and test1ng (RD&T) costs. 
• Fifty percent SUbS1dy of the RD&T costs for the dedicated freighter 
program could 1ncrease the resulting a1rline ROI by 5 percentage 
p01nts and decrease the a1rl1ne 1nvestment 30 percent. Such subsidy 
would make the dedicated freighter program econom1cally feaslble for 
payloads well above the a1rcraft size lim1tations lmposed by maJor 
eX1st1ng airports. 
• The analysis of RD&T subsidy 1ndicated that the underlying econom1CS 
may have sufflclent latltude to accommodate some degradations 1n 
weight and/or performance lmposed by mllitary requlrements when 
compared to a commercial freighter without subsidy. 
• Although not economically sized, compet1tive econom1C analysis of 
non-conventional aircraft configurat1ons showed that a 235.8 tonne 
(260 ton) payload Spanloader (m1nimum Slze to be compet1t1ve w1th 
conventional conf1guratl0ns) and a 149.7 tonne (165 ton) payload 
M=0.7 Propfan have the potentlal to economically compete wlth the 
reference fleet of current and derlvative aircraft. Although both 
conf1gurations encompass characteristlcs that could conflict with 
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airport/airways operations they should be given further consideration 
for the post 1995 time period. The M=0.8 Propfan and the laminar 
flow control (LFC) aircraft were consldered economically undesirable 
based upon the configurations evaluated. 
• Economic analysis substantiated the conclusion that bigger aircraft 
are not necessarlly better. While small payload dedicated freighter 
aircraft can be economically preferred over large payloads they pose 
operational problems such as large increases in frequency. On the 
other hand, large payloads offer operational advantages but at possible 
economic penalty to the airlines in spite of their reduced trip cost. 
• There are many issues remaining to be resolved before the viability 
and preferred size of a post 1995 dedicated freighter aircraft can 
be established. Among the more prominent of these issues are airport 
capacity limitations and operational restrlctions, institutional 
barriers, and fuel avallability. 
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Section 1 
THE AIR CARGO INDUSTRY 
There are many factors, 1n and out of the cargo system, which have 1nter-
reacted to br1ng the industry to the level of development 1t is at today. The 
results are evidenced in patterns of movement, commodities sh1pped, operations 
performed, and inter-modal competition, that eX1st under an umbrella of 
polltlcal and economic regulat10ns and agreements. 
A1rfreight and Its Movement 
The pattern of united States industrial growth has been such that in 
nearly every instance the growth of supporting industr1es has occurred in 
close proxim1ty to major industrial centers. The result is that the maJor 
port10n of domestic freight movement is intraregional, reference Figure 1-1, 
and 1S handled by surface transport over average hauls of about 450 kilometers 
(279.7 statute miles) for trucks and 850 kilometers (528.3 statue miles) for 
rail. A relat1vely small portion, 0.3 percent, of the interregional movement 
is handled by air. The distr1bution of th1S a1rfreight in 1976 1S shown in 
Figure 1-1 w1th the pr10r four year growth presented in Figure 1-2. In spite 
of this pattern of movement air cargo managed to grow at an average annual 
compounded rate of 12.5 percent between the years 1963 and 1976. 
During 1976 ten city-pairs accounted for 20 percent of the total domest1c 
airfreight of 4.2 billion tonne-kilometers (2.9 b1ll10n short ton-statute miles). 
With the exception of CHI-NYC the yearly variations of flow over these routes, 
identif1ed in parenthesis, are shown in Flgure 1-3. OVer the period of 1973 
to 1976 the flow between these city pairs has e1ther declined or remained 
constant with no consistant pattern apparent. It is evident, therefore, that 
the realized growth occurred over the lower activity routes and through the 
add1ton of new serV1ces. Wh1le there was no correlation between capacity 
offered and airfre1ght carried between the top 10 city-pairs when considered 
(Tot.l Tonne. 20 At rport. - 4.073 000) 
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Flgure 1-3. Ten Top Domestic City-Pairs (Ranked by Tonne-K1lometers) 
individually, such correlat10n d1d occur when based upon the combined totals 
as lllustrated 1n F1gure 1-4. It is surmized, therefore, that short range 
trend lines are not a singly maJor factor 1n the allocat1on of capac1ty. 
The types of commodit1es sh1pped by air w1thin the U.S. has remained 
relatively constant as illustrated by the var1at10n 1n the top ten commod1ties 
shown 1n Table 1-1. For 1972 twenty, four-d1g1t SIC commod1ty classes (out of 
over 2500 classes) accounted for 85 percent of the air freight. Cons1dering 
the nature of the top ten commod1t1es 1t is not surpr1s1ng that market demand 
has seasonal patterns w1th the largest decline occurr1ng between the fourth 
and f1rst quarters. 
A1r cargo has been character1zed as a small sh1pment industry w1th 75 per-
cent of the total shipments we1ghing less than 90 kilograms (198 pounds). A 
l1m1ted number of sh1pments exceed the 4500 k1lograms (9912 pounds) defined as 
small by the Interstate Commerce Comm1ssion (ICC). While the small sh1pment 
market is large, 4.8 mill10n sh1pments per day 1n 1974, 
very uneven work load at the term1nals. In one example 
4000 and 17 000 sh1pments per month over a year's t1me. 
1t does result in a 
this load varied between 
A port10n of the total 
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TABLE I-I. 
TOP TEN COMMODITIES 
Rank by Year 
Conmodlty 1955 1965 1970 1971 1975 
Machlnery Parts and Equl pment 1 
I 
1 3 3 1 
Cut Flowers. Hortlculture 2 7 
I 
6 5 3 
Electrical Products 3 I 5 1 I 2 4 
I Wearlng Apparel 4 I 3 2 i 1 5 I I Pnnted Matter 5 4 ! 4 4 2 I 
Auto Parts and AcceSSOries 6 I 2 5 
I 
6 I 6 
Alrcraft Parts 7 I - 10 - I 8 I General Hardware 8 9 
- - -
Advertising Dlsplay Matter g 
-
-
I 
- -
Photographlc Fllm 10 -
- - -
Meta 1 Products 
- 10 J 10 -1 Phonograph Reco ds. Tapes. I Records - - 7 -Fresh Produce - 6 8 9 
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problem 1S relieved by the forwarders who often consolidate shipments prior to 
terminal handling. In 1975 these forwarders, 1ncluding United Parcel Service 
(UPS), accounted for about 43 percent of the airfre1ght transported between 
the top 10 city-pa1rs. 
The dlstrlbution of world alrfrelght movement during 1976 is shown in 
F1gure 1-5. The European region originates, by a small margin, the greatest 
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Figure 1-5. Percentage Dlstribution of World Airfreight by 
Originating Region, 1976 
quantity of combined scheduled and non-scheduled freight with the U.S. in 
second place followed by the Asia Pac1fic region. During the f1ve year per10d 
1972-1976 the Africa, Middle East and Asia Pacific regions had the greatest 
growth. Also in terms of growth the top ranking countries, in order, were the 
Un1ted States, USSR, Un1ted Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, 
Canada, Lebanon and Italy. 
Although the United States is the top originator of scheduled airfre1ght 
the scheduled foreign airlines have been increas1ng their share of the total 
market. Between the years 1963 and 1976 the U.S. International market has 
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grown at an average compounded annual rate of about 14 percent while the com-
bined growth of 44 of the major foreign airlines has increased about 19 percent 
per year. During 1976 these foreign airlines carr1ed 56 percent of the combined 
U.S. Domestic, U.S. International and Foreign markets. 
Forty percent of U.S. dollar exports were flown to the Western Bloc 
countries with 30 percent moving to the Asian area. In 1976 the portions 
mov1ng by air were 23 percent by value and 0.3 percent by weight to Europe and 
17 percent by value and 0.1 percent by weight to Asia. On the other hand, 
40 percent of U.S. 1mports came from Asia and 25 percent from European Bloc. 
A1r shipments were 11 percent by value, 0.2 percent by weight, from Asia and 
21 percent by value, 0.8 percent by weight, from Europe. These values give 
evidence to the fact that there exists a large potential for air penetration 
in 1nternational trade. 
The air penetration potential was investigated with detailed analysis of the 
trade between the U.S. and sixteen of 1tS maJor trading partners. In this 
analysis screened sea volumes were derlved by excluding low-value bulk com-
modities. The resulting screened sea tonnes, the potential for air sh1pment, 
amounted to about 10 percent of the total sea movement. Results are illustrated 
for ten specific routes in Table 1-2. With the exception of exports to Germany 
and the Un1ted Kingdom a1r shipments were all less than 10 percent of even the 
screened tonnes. Similar behav10r can be noted in sea trade routes around the 
world indicating a broad base of potent1al future airfre1ght. 
As we proceed 1nto the future there will not be any big surprises in the 
commodities that w1ll be sh1pped by air. As in the past, there will be Sh1fts 
1n and out of the top 20 commodities and a continued increase in the percent 
of manufactured goods. Orig1n patterns of the latter wlll change due to the 
growth of develop1ng regions and the search for cheaper labor. New products 
w1ll enter the market and some will d1sappear with an overall trend toward 
m1natur1zation and compactness, however, these changes will not be apparent at 
the five dig1t SITe code level. There will be little change in the average 
warehouse dens1ty of air cargo h1gh value bulk or processed goods. Reductions 
1n air tar1ffs relat1ve to other modes and cont1nu1ng inflat10n will lower 
the value threshold (dollars/kilogram) of a1r el1gibil1ty 1n constant dollars. 
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TABLE 1-2. 
SELECTED U.S. INTERNATIONAL AIRFREIGHT ~~RKETS 
I Total I Alr % of I Alr % I Sc reened I Tota 1 Screened of 
Selected Markets , Alr Tonnes Sea Tonnes I Sea Tonnes Sea I Total Sea 
---------- --+ 
I I NYC to Germany 30 272 199 853 241 005 15 1 11 1 
Germany to NYC 26 386 570 442 i 655 852 4 6 I 3 9 I 1 NYC to UK 34 542 262 604 I 498 183 13 2 6 5 UK to NYC 21 910 500 176 I 882 362 4 4 2 4 
NYC to BraZll 9 927 138 223 I 153 317 7 2 6 1 
Brazll to NYC 10 354 214 413 I 254 584 4 8 4 1 
LAX to Japan 9 047 714 930 2 324 730 1 2 o 4 
Japan to LAX 22 948 2 408 832 2 426 708 1 0 1 0 
LAX to Indonesla 512 34 264 53 949 1 5 1 0 
Indonesla to LAX 67 10 165 13 310 442 o 7 
-
-- - -165 965 5 080 902 20 801 132 3 3 o 8 
Reflned minerals wlll become eligible back-haul frelght for select regions and 
market characterlstlcs. 
The U.S. Domestic air cargo market will have its largest growth in the 
South and Southwest portions of the country. Concerns for energy, envlronment 
and labor will see the creation and re-locatlon of industries in these areas 
that can effectively utillze airfreight as part of their total productlon 
process. The largest internatlonal growth will occur in the developing reglons 
of the world, prlmarlly South America, West-Central Africa, Middle East and 
the Far East includlng malnland Chlna. Growth in the encompassed countries 
wlll result in ever changlng patterns in the types of commodlties exported 
and lmported depending upon the reglons state of development. A key to 
achlevlng high growth in these emerging markets may be through the application 
of total distribution cost concepts backed up by aggressive educational/sales 
efforts by the airllnes. In all reglons the industry must cultivate high 
volume shlpments that occur on a regular basis. 
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A1r Elig1bility 
The dec1s1on to use or not to use a particular mode to Sh1P a particular 
product at a particular p01nt in t1me 1S a function of the product and market 
characteristics and the decision process employed by a part1cular shipper or 
cons1gnee. In the past, these factors have 1nteracted to facil1tate segregat10n 
of air cargo into three basic categories, namely, emergency, per1shable, and 
divert1ble. Emergency fre1ght consists of products that are sh1pped by a1r due 
to the opportunity cost, such as lost sales due to delayed del1very, associated 
wlth a particular market/dlstribution situation and/or phys1cal considerations. 
As an example, the central point inventorlng of repa1r parts that is employed 
by manufacturers in many areas of the U.S. and/or the world. In such cases 
air cargo 1S a planned element of the distribution system yet is often 
1dent1f1ed as emergency use of a1r. Per1shable fre1ght 1S made up of products 
that are real1st1cally sh1pped by the fastest ava1lable mode due to phys1cal 
and/or demand perishab1lity. D1vert1ble freight 1S that Wh1Ch 1S sh1pped by a 
variety of modes depend1ng upon its econom1C and physical properties and the 
demand for the product. 
The importance of the respective product and market character1stics d1ffer 
with the type of fre1ghti not all the crlterla are considered ln all cases. 
The applicability of the respective character1stics w1thin each of the through-
freight categories 1S illustrated in Table 1-3. As the importance of the ship-
ment decreases, emergency to divertible, the number of criteria pert1nent to 
dec1sion process, increases. 
The product character1stics identif1ed 1n Table 1-3 can well serve as 
indicators of air freight's potential to fulf1ll a company's distr1bution needs. 
The importance of each criter1an must be determ1ned on the basis of the shipper's 
or consignee's unique sltuation and method.of evaluation. 
Physical perishab1l1ty. - If product deterioration enroute to the assigned 
market occurs more rapidly than the surface transportation can be performed 
then alr cargo is a logical cholce provided market conditions allow a sufficient 
margin to cover the added cost of alr transport. However, there are cases where 
lt may be more economical to ShlP by a slower mode and accept partlal perish-
abllity. 
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TABLE 1-3. 
AIR ELIGIBILITY CRITERIA 
Type of Freight 
Emergenc), Pertshable Oivertible 
Product Physical Pertshabi11t 
Characterhtles Transit Environment 
Weight. Size Vol 
lead Ti 
Yalue/\.Ie1ght Ratt 
Dens1t 
Product Range 
Production Process 
Harket 
Character1 5 tics Opportunity Cost Valu 
Life-Cycle Stag 
Market Locatio 
-Demand Perl shab1l1 ty 
Demand Var1abil it 
Hark-UPS 
01spersed Demand 
Mode Choice Fastest Available Fastest - If Market l\ode Ghtng Lowest 
Conditions Allow Totll Cost of 
Har-g1n Sufficient Distribution 
to Cover Cost 
Translt environment. - Air fre1ght provides a superior environment and 
the reduced transit time decreases the exposure to the risks of damage and 
theft. 
Weight, size, and volume. - Vehicle compatib1lity 1S highly dependent 
upon the transport mode. Airfreight is often restrict1ve relative to weight, 
Slze, volume, although the wide-body a1rcraft are helping to relieve this 
situation. 
Lead tlme. - Allowable values must be established by either the shipper 
and/or conslgnee on the bas1s of the cons1dered market. This is a pertinent 
consideration to improving air cargo service. 
Value-to-weight rat10. - The higher the value per pound of a product the 
more likely it w1ll be sh1pped by air as evidenced in Figure 1-6. However, 
f1nancial management and intangible benefits of air cargo are becoming 
increas1ngly important, maklng a1r distribut10n profltable at decreasing value-
to-weight ratios. 
Density. - Surface modes discriminate more against lighter products than 
do the airlines. The density break for air occurs at 142.7 kilograms per 
cubic meter (9 pounds per CUblC foot), lower density products are charged this 
welght break rate to compensate for the volume occupied. 
Product range. - Selection of a limited number of ltems for air shipment, 
out of a wlde product deslgn range, decreases the costs associated with fluctua-
tions in demand and the capital tled up in high levels of inventories. 
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Figure 1-6. Commodity Value in U.S. Air Trade to the Far East 
Production process. - Products having long production lead times or those 
employing the batch process are less likely to be shipped by air. Products 
produced at rates compatible with demand are potential candidates for diversion 
to air transport. 
The preceding commodity characteristics must be consldered in the light 
of the market environment in order to realistically evaluate the economics of 
air cargo versus surface transport. The following market characteristics are 
highly determlnant in deciding whether air cargo will provide marketlng and/or 
distrlbutlon advantages sufficient to offset the cost. 
Opportunity cost value. - Opportinity cost is equivalent to the profit 
that could be derlved from a specific market if the right products were 
available at the right time and ln the desired quantity. 
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Life cycle stage. - Related to the risks involved in putting new products 
on the market or in putting existing products into new markets. 
New product introduction. - Where timely opportunity to introduce new or 
different products offset the additional transportation cost of air over surface. 
In these cases time is of the essance and air freight tariffs are a secondary 
consideration. 
Market location. - Air transport might be favored where significant 
barriers to surface transport exists or where the circuity of surface trans-
portation causes undesired time delays. 
Demand perishability. - Related to products which are time sensitive from 
the standpoint of demand. The fastest mode of transport is desired provided 
the market conditions can accommodate a sufficient margin to cover the cost of 
that mode. 
Demand variability. - In markets where demand is volatile the air mode 
can be used to meet either greater or less than the expected demand with a 
resulting reduction of risk associated with large inventories. 
Markups. - There are products for which the markup depends on the market 
situation resulting in a possible trade-off between risk and profit. In these 
markets slow transportation can maximize profit at the risk of market change 
while airfreight could take expeditious advantage of the market situation. 
D1spersed demand. - Air transport could be favored where production and 
consumption are dispersed and/or when the production process takes place in 
two or more widely separated locations. 
Air cargo 1S not always the most expensive mode of transport. The preced-
ing criteria are most important where the air rates are higher and the mode 
choice should consider the total distribut10n cost in the framework of the 
shipper's total production system. In such cases the product and market 
cr1teria init1ally serve to qualitatively indicate a product's applicability 
to air transport. Once the cost benefit analysis is underway these criter1a 
serve to ident1fy factors and considerations to be included in the analysis. 
In the majority of cases, the product and market characteristics are quanti-
fiable to the level required for decision. However, there are cases when the 
conditions prevent quantification with the result that pertinent qualitative 
factors are also ignored. This procedure may lead to erroneous conclusions 
since it appears that qualitative analysis can identify potential benefits 
that are becoming increas1ngly important in today's competitive markets. 
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Political and Economic Factors 
Airfreight markets and the air cargo industry are effected by internatlonal 
agreements along with economic and non-economic regulations. Often the result-
ing requirements represent institutional road blocks to such things as 
efficient aircraft utllization and the acceptance of large aircraft, lnterllne 
gauge changes, network and frequency changes, and reductlons in customs 
processing time. Table 1-4, elaborated upon in the paragraphs that follow, 
TABLE 1-4. 
THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL FACTORS 
International Agreements 
o IN Bennuda I I X X IN 0 IN OOC4 IN 
Tariffs X X II + 0 
Quotas X X III II + 0 
Voluntary Quotas X X II + 0 
Non-Econcrnlc Regulatfons 
1'1"" 
Curfews and Night 
Flight Rul es X X X I II III 
-
D DOCIIOC5 
Noise X X X III II I o D IN D DOCIIOC 
Alr Pollution X X X III II I 
° ° 
IN D DOCIIOC 
Hazardous Materia Is X X X 
Economlc Regulations 
International Tariff X X 
International Eco-
nomic X X 0 
Oomestic Market Entry X D 
Domestic Price X 
Hori zonta 1 Mergers X 
Vertical Merqers X 1OC 
Cfvll Reserve Air Fleet X X + 0 0 0 IN I~ 0 DOC 
The nature of deman~ classlflcatlons, reference Alr Eliglblhty sectlon 
I - largest effect, II - next largest effect, III - .mallest effect 
o - direct effect, IN - lndirect effect 
DOC - direct operatlng costs 
IOC - lndlrect operating costs 
IN 
IN 
IN 
D 
H 
l 
summarizes the impact of a representative portion of the factors that are 
considered in the body of the CLASS report. 
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Of the international agreements in effect the Bermuda II Agreement (July 
23, 1977) between the u.s. and U.K. may well serve as a model for forthcoming 
future agreements between other nations and the U.S. The result could be a 
promotion of foreign flag at the expense of American flag airlines with a sub-
sequent decrease in the capaclty serving some routes. While the limitations 
imposed on Fifth Freedom rights will decrease the load factors of U.S. carriers 
between foreign countries the increased number of change of gauge points 
allowed will facilitate better aircraft utilization. 
The impact of tariffs and quotas lS to decrease the supply of the effected 
commodity with a resulting increase in price and a decrease in demand. Divert-
able commodities are the most sensitive to the ensuing elasticitles of demand 
followed by perishable and emergency freight. Continuation of the current 
trend to reduce world trade barriers will increase the airfreight market demand 
while the formation of economic blocks (e.g., European Economic Community, 
Arab League) will stimulate intrabloc while decreasing interbloc trade. 
Although tariffs and quotas are on the decline, trade restrictions on hlgh-
value consumer goods are on the increase. This results in the export of IItop 
of the linell items thus increasing the value per pound and lncreasing the 
volume of air eligible commodities. 
Non-economic regulations have a profound effect on the ability of the air 
cargo industry to provlde desired services. Among these regulations are the 
curfews and night flight rules being imposed by airports both here and abroad. 
Air cargo flights are time sensitlve preferring to leave late in the evening 
and arrive early the next morning. The proliferatlon of restrictions on night 
operations both in the U.S. and abroad will restrict overnight domestic service 
and the flight windows for international service. In addition, the city enforc-
ing the curfew pays a price in service with a subsequent reduction in economic 
activity that permeates throughout the community. 
Noise abatement and air pollution programs greatly increase airline 
expenses, especlally those requiring the retrofittlng of aircraft. Such is 
the case for the Clvil Aeronautics Board (CAB) FAR 36 and the International 
CiVll Air Organization (ICAO) CAN 5 which set maxlmum acceptable aircraft noise 
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levels. These regu1atlons require modificatlon, compatible with the following 
t1metable, of all Jet aircraft having a maximum takeoff weight of 34 000 kilo-
grams (74 900 pounds) or greater. 
Aircraft not powered by JT-8D engines, 100% by 1985 
A1rcraft powered by JT-8D engines, 100% by 1983 
In addition, environmental" 1mpact stud1es are requ1red (CAB SFAR 27) when 
add1ng or1g1ns and destinations or when changing operat10ns at an airport. 
Hazardous mater1al regulations are establ1shed by the Department of Trans-
portation (DOT) CFR T1tle 49 for all transport modes. In the past these 
requ1rements have been poorly understood and, in some cases, poorly enforced. 
In the future these DOT requirements will be rewritten and more widely under-
stood. The enforcement of the Internat1ona1 Air Transport Assoc1ation's regu1a-
t10ns for foreign serV1ce w1ll gradually improve. 
Economic regulations are established by a variety of agenc1es and in total 
define the commercial environment in which airlines operate. The International 
A1r Transport Association (lATA) was establ1shed primar1ly to set tariffs on 
1nternational routes. These tariffs depend upon the unan1mous approval of all 
lATA members and the cognizant aeronautical agency of each of the affected 
member nat1ons. The resulting rates are not always followed since membership 
1S not mandatory and because rebat1ng 1S widespread in the 1nternational air 
cargo industry. 
The International Civil Aviation Organizat10n (ICAO), now a special agency 
of the United Nations, 1n part has responsibility for the economic aspects of 
international a1r transport. The funct10nal ab1lity of this organization is 
seriously handicapped by the fact that the reporting of airline operat1onal 
stat1st1cs is not mandatory. 
Since deregulation of U.S. Domestic air cargo anyone who can establish 
capab1l1ty and worthiness can establ1sh an a1r fre1ght business. Although 
rates are st11l filed they need not be approved and the CAB acts only in cases 
of possible rate dlscrim1nation. However, in the case of mergers government 
approval is still required. Dependlng on the type of merger, a vertical between 
a1r1ines or a horizontal between competing modes, a mu1tip11clty of government 
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agencies can be involved. Of equal concern to the industry must be the CAB's 
eliminatlon of reporting requirements that accompanied deregulation. This 
action. unless picked up by other government and/or private agencies. will 
leave the air cargo industry without the means to moniter its domestic perfor-
mance and for the airlines to evaluate the1r efficiency within the industry. 
The lack of knowledge of cargo and traffic movement will seriously handicap 
advance planning efforts thus stimulating deficient service and poor utilization 
of equipment. The result could be a further exaggeration of the resource 
utilization problem already solidly established in surface transportation. 
The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is an integral part of the National 
Transportation Plan's standby programs and procedures for emergencles. Estab-
lished by Executive Order No. 10999 1n 1952. the plan requires the Office of 
Emergency Transportat10n of the Department of Commerce to allocate to the 
Department of Defense (DOD) specific aircraft, with designated capab1lities, 
for use 1n direct support of the m1litary airl1ft needs. The DOD, working 
with the nat10n's airlines, arranges for a contractual release of the CRAF 
aircraft for emergency service. To help develop the program, military airlift 
contracts are awarded only to those civil airlines that are members of CRAF. 
Competitive Modes 
At the present time air cargo's primary competition on land is the truck 
and, of course. the contalner ship at sea. Due to developments in technology 
and changes 1n the social and economic environments the competitive pos1tions 
of all modes will undoubtedly change in the future. It is essential, therefore, 
to clarify future developments in the respect1ve modes and to understand the 
poss1ble effects of such changes upon the mode's potential competitiveness. 
The truck1ng industry has been continuously increasing its share of 
domestic interc1ty freight movement reaching a level of 33 percent of the 
total 1n 1975. Comparable values for rail and air were 51 percent and 0.25 
percent respectively with the balance handled by the sea mode. Although the 
a1r share was small its growth rate exceeded that for trucking as shown in 
Figure 1-7, note scale change. Except for the cloth1ng and data processing 
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products where shippers rely heavlly on alrfreight, trucking predominates in 
the transport of manufactured goods. In additlon trucks reduced the rail and 
alr shares of produce movement as illustrated ln Flgure 1-8. The data shown 
Figure 1-7. Volumes by Mode 
LAX-NYC 
1972 ~ 
117 416 Tonnes 141 110 Tonnes 
Figure 1-8. Fresh Frults and Vegetables, 1972 to 1976 
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Flgure 1-9. Revenue per Tonne-Kilometer 
in Figure 1-9, based upon total revenue and movement, illustrates the fact 
that such mode shifts are not due to cost alone. CLASS investigations indicate 
that service from the standpoints of containerization, loading and unloading 
on a door-to-door basis, and pick-up to delivery time, often predominate in 
the mode decision process. Airfreight has the advantage in transit time being 
1/2 to 1/5 of motor and 1/3 to 1/6 of rall domestically, and 1/11 to 1/27 of 
ocean travel time internationally. 
The structure of class and commodity rates underlying the transportation 
revenues is a very involved subject reaching an ultimate with the rail mode 
that has 43 trillion commodity rates on file with the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC). In order to develop a basic understanding of the relative 
rate structures of the air, surface, and sea modes, six commodity classes and 
seven weight breaks were investigated for ten domestic and twelve international 
origln-destinations. 
The welght breaks at which transportation tariffs show significant declines 
vary wlth mode occurring at 225, 445 and 2270 kilograms (496, 980 and 5000 
pounds) for alr; at 225 and 9080 kllograms (496 and 20 000 pounds) for truck; 
and at 4540 kllograms (10 000 pounds) for rail. For the cases investigated 
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the air tarlffs range from 10 percent to 734 percent higher than the comparable 
truck tariffs. Rail tariffs range between 41 percent lower to 558 percent 
hlgher than truck tarlffs. In international traffic the alr tariffs as a per-
cent of ocean tariffs fall at every rate break since ocean tariffs are constant 
per kllogram. While some air tariffs are over 1400 percent greater than ocean 
tarlffs there are many origin-destinations and commodlties where air tariffs 
are less than ocean tarlffs for small shlpments, 45 kilograms (99 pounds). 
However, for clothlng shipments between Rio de Janelro and New York the air 
tariffs are 79 percent to 59 percent lower than sea tariffs over the full range 
of welght breaks. 
If air cargo lS to substantially grow in the future it must begin capturing 
hlgh volume shipments on a regular baS1S. A necessary, but not sufficient, 
condition for thlS expansion is a reduction in the air carrlers total operating 
costs and a subsequent lowering of alr tariffs relative to truck, rall and 
contalner ship tarlffs. To acquire a better understanding of how these 
objectlves could be achleved, the operating costs of alr and the competing 
modes were flrst segregated into the line haul, terminal and plck-up and 
dellvery (PU and D), and then lnto the capital, fuel, maintenance and labor 
components. Comparisons with the surface modes were based upon a DC-8-63F 
for air, a single 12.2 meter (40 foot) trailer for trucking, and 12.2 meter 
trallers loaded on a 70-car mixed traln and a 35-car through train for rail. 
When adJustments were made for shipment density and route circuity the 
difference ln total cost to ship 907 kilograms (2000 pounds) over 1979 kilo-
meters (1230 statute miles) by air compared to the cost by surface was reduced 
between 16 and 30 percent, depending on the mode considered. The resulting 
alr cost was 82 percent higher than truck, 102 percent higher than a 70-car 
train, and 149 percent higher than a 35-car train. These results indicate a 
substantially different competltlve position for air when viewed relative to 
prior expectations. 
The relative importance of the three total cost elements, llne haul, 
terminal and PU and D, to intermodal competltiveness is illustrated in 
Flgure 1-10. These percentage figures indlcate that line haul costs for 
air are a smaller percentage of the total cost, and hence of lesser importance, 
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than for other modes. Th1S result, along with the relat1vely h1gh importance 
of termlnal costs to a1r compet1t1veness, was not expected when the analysis 
was begun. However, to understand the reduction of the 1ntermodel cost gap 
(dlscussed 1n the preceding paragraph) requ1res knowledge of the components 
that make up the cost elements of Figure 1-10. 
The line haul cost for a1rfre1ght is 42 percent to 126 percent greater 
than the surface modes due pr1mar1ly to the fuel component as 111ustrated in 
the follow1ng table. The high fuel cost of rail is due to payload density 
and route c1rcuity adJustments and the inclus10n of truck movement between the 
truck and ra1l term1nals. Air excells in two areas, labor compared to trucks 
and maintenance compared to ra1l. 
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RATIO OF LINE HAUL COSTS 
907 K1lograms Total Fuel Labor Captial Maintenance 1979 K1lometers 
A1r/Truck 1.42 4.68 0.44 2.91 1.67 
Air/Tra1n 
70-car 1.66 3.53 1.47 1.67 0.85 
35-car 2.26 4.38 1.43 3.61 0.96 
A component breakdown of line haul costs for the respect1ve modes 1S presented 
below. 
COMPONENTS OF LINE HAUL COSTS 
907 K1lograms Percent of L1ne Haul Cos 
1979 Kil ometers Fuel Labor Ca~l tal Malntenance 
Air 28 19 41 13 
Truck 8 61 20 11 
Ra1l 
70-car 13 22 40 25 
35-car 14 30 25 31 
The predominat1ng components are capital costs for air and labor costs for 
truck1ng. In the case of ra1l the h1ghest cost varies between labor, cap1tal 
and maintenance, however, rail is burdened by high maintenance costs when 
compared to e1ther air or truck. 
Results of the intermodal comparisons ind1cated that terminal costs are 
surprisingly high compared to truck terminal costs. 
RATIO OF TERMINAL COSTS 
907 K1lograms Total Labor CaP1tal 
Air/Truck 3.24 3.16 4.86 
The 386 percent higher capital cost is partially explained by the higher a1rport 
land values and greater terminal mechanization. The higher labor costs can be 
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explained in terms of air terminal peak1ng, level of service and current 
operational procedures. The component breakdown of terminal costs are compar-
able for the a1r and truck modes w1th 5 to 8 percent for capital and the 
remainder for labor. These data substantuate the finding that if the air mode 
1S to improve its competitive position the air terminal costs must be reduced 
w1th no penalty to serV1ce. The increased importance of this cost reduct10n 
at shorter ranges is illustrated in Figure 1-10. A1r terminal costs increase 
from 20 to 37 percent of total costs when the range decreases from 1979 to 
972 kilometers (1230 to 490 statute miles) while the comparable trucking costs 
go from 13 to 22 percent. 
The last element of total cost to consider is PU and D. As for the 
terminal operat10ns the cost for PU and D of 907 kilograms (2000 pounds) of 
freight is 85 percent higher for air than for truck. Air has 43 percent 
greater labor costs and 65 percent greater maintenance costs. The most 
important cost component is labor which accounts for 50 to 60 percent of PU 
and D costs for air or trucks. 
The comblned results of Figure 1-10 and the preceding discussions indicate 
that line haul capital and fuel costs be at the top of the list of potential 
improvements followed by terminal costs. If the air terminal and PU and D 
costs were reduced to the level for truck transport then the cost differential 
between air and truck freight would be comparable to the current cost differ-
ential between truck and rail. Considerlng line haul costs, the availability 
and cost of fuel wlll be among the determining factors 1n the future growth of 
the alr cargo lndustry. However, assuming the availability problem is solved, 
the impact of fuel price on intermodal competitiveness cannot be viewed in 
isolation but must be considered relative to such factors as technological 
improvements, spiraling wages, and the availability and cost of money. The 
potential to reduce fuel consumption through advances in mater1als, vehicle 
design, and propulsion efficiency is greatest for the air mode. The labor 
intenslveness of the line haul cost is less for air than for either rall or 
trucks. And finally, inflation, interest rates, and capital availability will 
serve to increase the value of tlme, tlme in the warehouses and in transit. 
Relative to the latter, while rail speeds are expected to gradually lncrease, 
air and highway speeds will remain about as they are. However, air can 
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improve its situation by reducing PU and D time relative to the other modes. 
In view of these antic1pated trends it is concluded that air cargo will improve 
its competltive position relative to trucking but will begin to lose ground 
relatlve to rail as we move into the late BO's. A contributing factor in the 
latter w1ll be a growing interest ln rail electr1fication, containerizatlon and 
truck on flat-car. 
The line haul cost differential between air and ocean transport was 
examlned over two routes, New York to the U.K. and U.K. to Japan. The Douglas 
DC-B-63F and the Boe1ng 747-100F were compared to a 1250 Twenty-foot Equivalent 
Unit (TEU) container ship on the N.Y-U.K. route and with a 2500 TEU container 
ship between the U.K. and Japan. Consideration was given to cargo density and 
route circu1ty based upon deep-sea procedures. 
The ratios of air to container ShlP costs are presented in the table 
below. With adjustments for freight denslty and circulty the total cost of 
shipping 907 kilograms (2000 pounds) by air is 2.1 to 3.B tlmes that by ship 
over the routes considered. 
RATIO OF LINE HAUL COSTS 
Insurance 
907 Kil ograms Total Fuel Labor Capital Malnt. Landing Fees Route 
Port Charqes 
DC-B/1250 TEU 2.7 7.6 1.7 2.0 13.7 1.1 U.S.-U.K. 
B747/1250 TEU 2.1 5.1 0.9 2.1 10.4 0.7 U.S.-U.K. 
DC-B/2500 TEU 3.B 3.9 5.0 2.5 19.5 2.7 U.K.-Japan 
B747-2500 TEU 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.2 17.B 2.2 U.K.-Japan 
The decrease 1n fuel ratios for U.K.-Japan compared to U.S.-U.K. lS due to the 
large surface circuity connected with passage through the Panama Canal. The 
large lncrease in the labor ratios for the U.K.-Japan route are mostly due to 
the hlgh stevedor1ng cost in New York. Slmilarly, the greater ratios for 
lnsurance, handling fees and port charges are due pr1marily to the high port 
charges 1n New York. 
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Breaking the line haul costs into its components, as shown below, 
indicates that capital costs are predominating for the B747 and the container 
ships. On the other hand, the DC-8 substitutes fuel for capital. Deep sea 
shlpping is generally more capital intensive than the airfreight industry. 
The increased importance of fuel for the 2500 TEU ship, long voyage, is due 
to the length of voyage where fuel accounts for over 60 percent of the daily 
operating costs inc1udlng capital. 
COMPONENTS OF LINE HAUL COSTS 
Percent of LinE Haul Costs 
Insurance 
970 Kilograms Fuel Labor Capital Maint. Landing Fees Routes 
Port CharQes 
DC-8-63F 32 21 27 14 6 U.S.-U.K. 
and 
B747-100F 28 14 38 14 6 U.K.-Japan 
1250 TEU 11 33 37 3 16 U.S.-U.K. 
2500 TEU 31 16 42 3 9 U.K.-Japan 
On short voyages, the labor costs, including stevedoring, are most important 
as illustrated by the 1250 TEU cost breakdown. In a siml1ar manner contalner 
ships are more port charge intensive than aircraft are landing fee intensive. 
The intensities of fuel, labor and capital are remarkably Slml1ar for the 
B747 and the 2500 TEU ship. As these costs increase in the future the cost 
competitiveness of these vehlc1es will remain relatively constant for long 
voyages. On the other hand the competitiveness of the B747 to the 1250 TEU 
ship will vary from the current situatlon with the realized improvement or 
degradatlon dependent upon the re1atlve increases of fuel and labor costs. 
As in the case of ground transport, the increasing value of time will intensify 
the advantage of air cargo since, in consideration for fuel, the line haul 
speed of containerships will tend to decrease, not lncrease. In addition 
there will be essentially no reduction in their PU and D time. 
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Section 2 
USERS VIEW OF AIR CARGO 
A primary obJective of the CLASS was to consider the users views during 
the analys1s and 1n outlin1ng future courses of action. To achieve this 
objective the case study research task was conducted to identify the current 
and future factors that determ1ne the use of airfre1ght, to obtain the users 
V1ew of the present air cargo system, and to understand the shippers des1res 
and requ1rements for the future. The approach taken was des1gned to m1n1mize 
self-reported reactions to suggested future a1rfreight concepts. If such 
concepts appear better at the moment they usually solicit op1nions which have 
no relation to the respondent's future behavior. The acquisition of data, 
and subsequent analyses, were therefore d1rected toward understanding the 
sh1pper's needs and mot1vations and out of that to draw inferences for the 
future. 
The case study research was conducted in two phases. The first phase 
consisted of 1n-depth, taped, 1nterv1ews with 34 users and non-users of air 
cargo Wh1Ch 1ncluded manufacturing, distribution, agricultural and professional 
firms plus airlines and forwarders. The large-scale mail survey performed in 
the second phase provided a statistical list of the hypothesis and issues 
examined in the depth interv1ews. The mail survey form contained 56 closed-
ended questions and 16 statistical and demographic questions. 551 transporta-
t10n and distribution execut1ves answered these questions using the L1kert 
scale. The follow1ng d1Scussion delineates the 1ntegrated f1ndings derived 
from the depth 1nterviews and the mail survey. 
Organ1zation of the Distribution Function 
The organization of the d1str1bution function was exam1ned because it 
can affect how and why mode choice decis10ns are made. Results show that in 
the majority of cases the d1str1bution function interacts informally with 
upper management in Finance, Market1ng and Product1on. Although not formally 
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1nvolved in developing broad obJect1ves, the distribut10n function 1S aware 
and sens1tive to the needs of the other fUnct10ns. Th1S 1S evidenced by the 
data of Figure 2-1 since system analys1s considers the collect1ve needs of 
all 1nvolved functions. 
PERCENT 
STATEMENT: MY COMPANY USES SYSTEM 
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AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT 
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Oecentralizat10n can present a handicap to the decis10n process. Although 
results 1ndicate an almost even d1vis10n between central1zed and decentralized 
f1rms there 1S a definite trend toward greater central1zat10n as shown 1n 
Figure 2-2. Manufacturers, espec1ally of h1gh value products, tend to be 
decentral1zed in operation and mode dec1sion making. However, centralization 
does not necessarily mean that one department has the responsibility for all 
d1str1bution dec1sions. Traffic managers at each plant location can make day-
to-day mode selections based upon advise from the staff distribution execut1ves. 
Mode Cho1ce Oec1sion-Making 
It was qU1te eV1dent that most firms currently employ a1rfreight on an 
urgency, "emergency" basis as illustrated by the mail survey results glVen 1n 
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STATEMENT: I WOULD CHARACTERIZE MY 
COMPANY AS BEING 
CENTRALIZED IN ITS MODE 
DECISIONS 
l00r-------------------------------------------~ 
PERCENT 
RESPONSE 
90 TOTAL 
80 AGREE-% 
NEITHER AGREE! 
70 DISAGREE-% 
60 DISAGREE 
50 
40 
30 
LDISAGREE 
- _____ .--J-" 
20 
10 
__ --__ [~:THER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
--- ------
o LESS THAN 
$1 
$1- $5- $10-
$4 99 $9 99 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE ($/LB ) 
Flgure 2-2. Centralized Decisions 
TABLE 2-l. 
REASONS FOR USING AIRFREIGHT 
R@ason Olr@ctionofShl!l'Ynt 
Outbound Inbound 
1 Urgency - I 477 60. 
0 Breakdowns 
0 Deadlines 
0 Backorders 
0 Speed In Transit 
, Competition , 
". 12. 
0 CustOll'lerService 
0 Increase CQllPetitiveneS5 
3 Service , 121 128 
0 Time Rellablllty 
0 less lOU/DaNg!! 
0 L 11111 ted Handling 
0 Trlclng 
• Cost 
, 7' e. 
0 TOC 
0 Cash Flow 
0 Cheaper than Altemat1ves 
0 High Product Value 
5 Other , 
...!!.! ~ 
Total - 1: 100 0 100 0 
65 
8 
27 
27 
Table 2-1. The situations identlfled under urgency apply to most industrles, 
exceptlons being the shipment of perlshables and high value per pound products. 
However, it must be emphaslzed that the terms urgency, "emergency", are generic 
wlth the speclfic meaning varying wldely as discussed in Section 1. In spite 
of the predomlnance of emergency applications alrfreight is often viewed as a 
tool that used routlnely can give the shipper a competltive edge when considered 
in the framework of total service with consideration for the cost/benefit trade-
offs. Heavier airfreight users, firms dominent in thelr fleld, and high value 
per pound producers, reference Figure 2-3, are predomlnent among the firms that 
STATEMENT: MY COMPANY USES AIRFREIGHT 
AS A ROUTINE, PLANNED PART 
OF ITS DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
100 
90 TOTAl 
80 AGREE-% 
NEITHER AGRE£J 
70 DISAGREE-% 
60 DISAGREE-% 
PERCENT 50 
RESPONSE 
40 
30 
21 
7 
72 
20 
10 ___ L NEITHER AGREE DR DISAGREE 
o~-L----~----~----~------------~ 
LESS THAN $1- $5- $10-
$1 $4 99 S9 99 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE (S/LB ) 
Figure 2-3. Planned Alrfreight Use 
use alrfrelght as a routine, planned part of their distribution system. Low 
value product producers were generally satisfied wlth surface transport as 
lllustraed ln Flgure 2-4, using airfreight on an emergency basis, Figure 2-5, 
for competitive reasons. 
Since the consignee bares the brunt of the economlC impact of the market 
orlented Clrcumstances surrounding the use of airfreight, it appears logical 
that the consignee should make the mode choice. While this perspective was 
strongly condoned in the depth interviews it was refuted by the mail survey 
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STATEMENT: MY FIRM CAN ALMOST ALWAYS 
SATISFY ITS CUSTOMER 
SERVICE OBJECTIVES BY USING 
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION 
100~----------------------------------~ 
90 TOTAL 
80 AGREE-% 736 
70 
NEITliER AGREEI 38 DlSAGREE-% 
60 DISAGREE-% 226 
PERCENT 50 RESPONSE 
40 
30 
20 
10 
DISAGREE-Y--
~ £-N~I~~ AGREEJDISAGREE 
----- -- --O~~ __ -L ____ -L ____ ~ ______________ ~ 
LESS THAN $1- $5- $10-
$1 $4 99 $999 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE ($/LB ) 
Figure 2-4. Customer SerVlce 
STATEMENT: MY COMPANY USES AIRFREIGHT 
ON AN UNPLANNED, 
EMERGENCY BASIS ONLY 
100r------------------------------------, 
90 
80 
70 
60 
PERCENT 50 
RESPONSE 
40 
30 
20 
10 
TOTAL 
AGREE-% 
NEITliER AGREEI 
DISAGREE-% 
DISAGREE-% 
DISAGREEY 
~L:~ITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
.----
o LESS THAN $1- $5- $10-
$1 $4 99 $9 99 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE ($/LB ) 
Figure 2-5. Unplanned Airfreight Use 
73 
6 
21 
29 
Wh1Ch showed the consignee to be less influential than the shipping f1rm 
unless that firm was the consignee. The greater influence of the shipper is 
espec1ally true for heavy a1rfreight users where the mode decision apparently 
becomes routine and the conslgnor assumes more of the responslbil1ty. 
Although rational costjbeneflt tradeoffs are employed ln mode cho1ce, the 
research results 1ndicate that the formal use of total distribut10n cost (TDC) 
techn1que 1S not w1despread. Th1S 1S substant1ated by the fact that wh1le 
1nventory carrying cost (ICC), a pertinent element 1n TDC, 1S used 1n evaluat-
1ng a company's d1stribut1on system it is not necessar1ly important 1n mode 
cho1ce as illustrated in Figure 2-6. A major barrier to formal use of TDC is 
STATEMENT: MY COMPANY CALCULATES AN INVENTORY 
CARRYING COST AND IT IS USED AS AN 
IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN CHOOSING 
MODES 
100 
90 TOTAL 
AGREE-% 301 
80 
70 
NEITHER AGREE/ 232 DlSAGREE-% 
PERCENT 60 
RESPONSE 50 ~ 
DISAGREE-% 467 
40 
30 _-----~GREE 
20 
_________ ,NEITHER AGREE/DISAGREE 
-- ... ----J.._ 
10 t oL--L ____ -L ____ J-____ ~ ______________ ~ 
LESS THAN SI- S5- S10-
$1 $4 99 S9 99 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE IS/LB ) 
F1gure 2-6. Inventory Cost 
the prev10usly discussed, lim1ted organlzational role of the transportation 
manager coupled wlth the fact that h1S performance 1S not pr1marily measured 
against budget as 111ustrated 1n F1gure 2-7. In many cases the TDC 1nputs 
requlred are not compat1ble with the account1ng procedures 1n use thus mak1ng 
the potent1al benef1ts marg1nal relative to the cost of 1mplementation. 
Decentralization presents a potent1al obstacle to the effective use of TDC 
because 1tS viabil1ty 1S dependent upon the h1gher quality and total1ty of 
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STATEMENT: THE TRANSPORTATION MANAGER 
IS PRIMARILY MEASURED 
AGAINST BUDGET 
100 
90 TOTAl 
80 AGREE-% 456 
70 
NEITHER AGRW 165 DlSAGREE-% 
60 DISAGREE-% 381 
PERCENT 50 RESPONSE 
40 
30 
-
20 
10 
(NEITHER AGRWDISAGREE 
----- -----------
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COMMODITY VALUE (S/LB ) 
Figure 2-7. Transportation Managers 
1nformation that may be difficult to obtain 1n a decentralized environment. 
Both the airl1nes and forwarders feel there is a need for educating the shipper 
on the TDC concept but also agree that such efforts have been relatively 
unsuccessful in the past because they appeared self-serving. 
Todays A1rfre1ght System 
Since urgency, competltion, and service are the domlnent reasons for uS1ng 
a1rfreight today, it can be concluded that service in general is the primary 
factor in airfreight use. This service accounts for the popularity of the 
forwarder 111ustrated in Table 2-2. Forwarders are preferred for their PU 
and D capab1lities, door-to-door possess1on, reliability and documentation. 
In contrast, the airlines are often seen as being unresponsive to the shippers 
or forwarders needs with sales personnel lacking product knowledge. The air-
llnes are viewed as being primarily concerned with a1rport-to-airport operat1ons 
and large volumes of freight. Shippers felt that the biggest airfreight 
problems are those associated with ground support and handling (airport con-
gestion, PU and D, operational procedures, etc.) rather than the airport-to-
airport segment. Other problems cited relate to the tracing of freight, and 
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TABLE 2-2. 
USE OF FORWARDERS 
STATEMENT: WHEN MY COMPANY SHIPS BY 
AIR, AN AIRFREIGHT 
FORWARDER USUAllY 
HANDLES THE SHIPMENT 
PRODUCT AGREE DISAGREE ~ !%l 
ELECTRONICS 583 250 
MACHINERY 522 246 
CHEMICALS 625 167 
DRUGS 632 246 
CLOTHING 810 143 
FOOD 561 341 
PAPER 375 625 
PRINT MATERIAL 733 67 
ADV AND SAMPlES 686 171 
TOYS 834 83 
MISCELLANEOUS 648 205 
BASE 549 TRANSPORTATION EXECUTIVES 
the lack of 11ft to and from appropriate citles. On the positlve slde, alr-
freight lS generally consldered to be more reliable than truck serVlce. How-
ever, lf firms can be competitive in the market place uSlng surface transport, 
that mode wlll prevall. Many firms have their own truck fleets to better meet 
their transportation needs. 
Results lndlcate that shippers are not greatly concerned with the type of 
aircraft or where the contalners are carrled ln the aircraft. Their concern 
is with quallty of service for the prlce charged. Regarding service, a large 
majority indicated that having the ability to self-load containers would not 
lncrease their use of alrfreight. Only one-third indlcated that overnlght 
(next day) delivery was mandatory. 
The Future Alrfreight System 
The shippers Vlew of the future airfreight system is described in cautious 
terms especlally wlth regard to equlpment needs. In general, the shlppers 
future planning efforts, beyond five years, do not adequately consider the 
interrelations between their anticipated future distributlon needs and the 
potentlal developments in transportation systems. 
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Forwarders were unanlmous ln advocating lmproved communications ln, what 
they view as, thelr partnershlp relations wlth the alrllnes. They also expect 
to see their number decrease and the posslblllty of conglomerates made up of 
steamshlp llnes, truckers, and airlines gettlng lnto the forwardlng buslness. 
On the other hand, the alrllnes expect to educate the shlpper on thelr door-
to-door capablllty. Thelr success, however, will be dependent on reachlng the 
approprlate decislon-makers. 
The shipper deslres improved service above all and in this respect they 
are ln favor of lntermodality. Most shlppers felt that intermodal capability 
wlll be a vltal element of the future transportatlon system. They Vlew lnter-
modality ln terms of single carrler responsiblllty wlth alrfreight as a partner 
in a fully lntegrated transportation system. Such system satisfles the need 
for efficlent door-to-door serVlce whlle reallzlng slngle carrier responsibillty. 
Shlppers were In favor of alrllnes provldlng the door-to-door service as 
illustrated In Flgure 2-8. They also saw the posslblllty of the conglomerate 
PERCENT 
RESPONSE 
STATEMENT: IN THE FUTURE AIRLINES 
SHOULD HANDLE TOTAL 
DOOR-TO-DooR 
TRANSPORTATION 
100,.....-------------------, 
90 TOTAL 
80 AGREE-% 541 
NEITHER AGREE! 366 OISAGREE-% 70 
60 OISAGREE-% 82 
50 
40 r NEITHER AGREE! ... _---------_..... DISAGREE 
" 30 
'" 
20 
10 
a LESS THAN $1- $5- $10-
$1 $4 99 $999 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE ($/LB ) 
Flgure 2-8. Door-To-Door Transportatlon 
multlmode groups suggested by the forwarders. These groups were visualized as 
provldlng worldwlde forwardlng serVlces, lncludlng unblased TOC analysls to the 
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sh1ppers. Some shippers hypothes1zed the demise of the comb1nation carriers 
on the basis that passenger and shipper needs cannot be adequately satisf1ed 
on the same aircraft, schedules and routes. 
One aspect of an intermodal system would be the 1ncreased use of conta1ners. 
Wh1le the forwarders favored the 8x8 container the a1rl1nes expressed m1xed 
feel1ngs, point1ng out such problems as a1rcraft weight and balance and the 
tare penalties occurring on weight limited flights. It was pointed out that 
while container1zat1on offers service advantages, such as secur1ty, these are 
currently realized by forwarders and large shippers not by the small shipper. 
Shippers had mixed opinions regarding the 1mpact of deregulation on serV1ce 
and rates. On the whole it 1S seen as having negligible positive effects on 
the airfreight industry. Many felt deregulation would accelerate the separation 
of passenger and cargo serVlces. Slnce deregulation will allow forwarders to 
acqu1re a1rcraft fleets, the forwarders postulated a resulting decrease in the 
differences between them and the airlines. 
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As shown in F1gure 2-9 sh1ppers were generally unresponsive to a 30 percent 
STATEMENT: IF THE DIFFERENTIAL BETWEEN SURFACE 
AND AIRFREIGHT RATES WERE REDUCED 
BY 30 PERCENT, MY COMPANY WOULD 
USE MORE AIR FREIGHT 
100 
90 TOTAL 
80 AGREE-'%. 46 
70 AGREE 
NEITHER AGREE! 30 DISAGREE-'%. 
60 DISAGREE-'%. 24 
PERCENT 50 RESPONSE 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
LESS THAN $1- $5- $10-
$1 $4 99 $9 99 MORE 
COMMODITY VALUE ($/LB ) 
Figure 2-9. Alrfrelght Rates 
rate reduction with interest belng substantlally greater for heavy airfreight 
users and higher value per pound producers. Some felt that a 60 to 70 percent 
reduction would be required to substantially stlmulate planned. volume shipments. 
Regardless of their activity level. shippers want to know a single door-to-door 
prlce. They. therefore. foresee one combined tariff that wlll be computerized 
and stored by a central source with most documentation performed by data 
processlng. 
There was the general opinion that there is a definite need for more 
economical aircraft of different sizes assigned to different markets. There 
was no concensus as to the type or performance of these alrcraft because 
shippers are not concerned with aircraft. per set put with services provided 
and rates charged. 
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Section 3 
THE AIR CARGO INFRASTRUCTURE 
In achieving future industry growth the importance of the direct support 
infrastructure will become increasingly evident and unless given proper atten-
tion can seriously curtail the growth that will be realized. In this respect 
the airport, cargo terminals, and route networks were considered in the CLASS 
as being principal infrastructure elements having cross impacts with the cargo 
market and aircraft. Containerization was also addressed in depth recognizing 
that it is categorically linked with the aircraft, the cargo terminal, the 
surface transport system, the shipper and consignee, and the cargo being moved. 
Airports 
An airport complex is composed of two basic elements, the airside and 
1andside, which collectively establish its operational capacity. On the air-
side the complex must be capable of efficiently handling varying sizes and 
number of aircraft and on the 1andside to effect time-phased transfer of cargo 
and passengers between aircraft and between the air and surface vehicles. Over 
the long run a balance between the airside and 1andside capaclties must be 
achieved withln the framework of the changing social, politlcal, physical and 
economic environments. A task of the CLASS was to determine the current and 
future compatibility between the resulting airport capacities and the air cargo 
system requirements. 
Detailed, on site, surveys in combination with published information were 
used to assess the impact of the airport elements on the total air cargo system. 
Surveys were conducted at lAX, JFK, ATl, ORD and DTW because these installations 
were consldered as havlng problems and obJectives typical of a majority of maJor 
air cargo centers. The forecast growth in air cargo flow through these airports 
as developed by the respective airport authorities, is shown in Flgure 3-1. 
This growth, if realized, will exaggerate already existing problems. As an 
example, all five surveyed alrports already have landside congestion, and 
37 
... :; 
'" ~
.... 
~ 
" g 
j!: 
0 
.... 
DC j 
DC 
:c 
~ 
z: 
<C 
4000 -
3600 
3200 
2800 
2400 
2000 
1600 
1200 
800 
400 
0 
-L-t-L I ~~~ , I ~--~'----, 
=w ' I ' I I : ' , 
~ __ ....J-:_-I- ~l ----1 ' I , I I , I ' I i I ~--, , 
_"1_1- ,,~ , ' ! ! , -t--~---------r----rw-i --;-; , I ! 
, 1 I I I 
, 
I I I I , 'J~l 
I , 
, 
i I i 1.,.-'" --~ I I , I , , I 
JFK 
! ! , I , --r , 
- ~- L: i , i I , , ..;..-- I ! I 
LAX 
ORO ~I 
-+- I ~'1' I , .......r ~, 
" 
' ,J I ~ , , All 
J ' ~ I_ I 
_?"'" .-- I 
-t.- '! , +rl~ I -~-- ---
, '-
--
I I I ~ i::r9--1-:-':1 I , 
.... ...-.. ~, I ,--- --I ' i '.-1, : I , 0'Tl/ 
~ I ..--1-"-, I -,- , , I 
.-!---;-----.-~---J..-'''''''''-: , -n-' 
.- I ~~- I I : 
, 
-
p-!.+ 
--r -- --, I , J ' , 1 
I I I I I I I I 
1976 77 78 79 1960 81 82 83 84 1965 86 87 88 89 1990 
Figure 3-1. Air Cargo Forecast for Domestic Airports 
environmental restrictions on operations and/or expansion. Ramp conditions 
limit the size and/or number of cargo aircraft that can be simultaneously 
loaded or unloaded at all but the Atlanta airport. Three of the five airports 
have runway congestion and/or some form of flow control. Congestion delays 
are already a very serious problem with the scheduled airlines. To illustrate, 
between 1968 and 1973 the increase in direct operating costs (DOC) due to air-
port delays (takeoff, landing and gateing) were twice the average airline 
earnings. Such deficiencies will become untenable in the light of further 
increases in fuel prices and decreasing availability. 
Listed below are airports antlcipated to be congested by 1990 for the 
reasons noted. Airports having the five highest levels of current all-cargo 
flights are deSignated by circles and appear on all three listings. Four of 
the airports, designated by the solid triangles, anticipated to have runway 
congestion already have flow control, while four of the remaining, deSignated 
by open triangles, are expected to have such controls by 1990. Some relief of 
the flow control problem can be expected from the advanced air traffic control 
(ATC) systems under development by the FAA. The 1987 system is expected to 
increase runway capacity up to 17 percent for intersecting runways and up to 
35 percent for parallel runways. The gain for intersecting runways is less 
due to alternating departures and arrivals. 
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Runway Congestion 
o ORD ! 
LGA ! 
o JFK ! 
DCA ! 
BOS ~ 
o SFO ~ 
o PHL ~ 
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ATl ~ 
o LAX 
Apron/Gate Congestlon 
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DEN 
Ground Access Congestion 
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Additional rellef for runway congestion could be achieved with larger 
aircraft thereby reducing the frequency of required fllghts. However, in some 
cases this may lead to a reduced market due to the accompanying reduction in 
service. In addition, runway/runway, runway/taxiway spacing combined with 
pavement width and strength limit the size of aircraft that can operate at 
most of todays major alrports to dimensions not much longer than the current 
B-747. The current ultimate constraint on wing span is the separation standard 
used in airport design. FAA standards specify 73 meters (240 feet) as the 
maximum span for future Group 4 alrports. The maximum allowable tread width 
is 15.2 meters (40 feet). There lS the additional requirement that all new 
aircraft must meet the nOlse standards of FAR Part 36 and the comparable ICAO 
CAN 5 dlscussed in Sec~ion 1. 
All-cargo operations are fortunate in the sense that they want to occur 
during the hours when total operations are lowest as illustrated by Figures 
3-2 and 3-3. However, nlght operatlons are seriously curtailed by the curfews 
invoked at domestic and forelgn airports, a trend that is expected to increase 
in the future. The operational windows for international flights are greatly 
reduced when both the orlgin and destlnatlon airports have curfews. Such 
restrictions lmpact world-wide schedules and lead to scheduling problems, 
reductlon in capacity offered and decreased aircraft utilization. At many 
airports night operations are further restricted by constraints on approach 
and departure procedures, use of reverse thrust, englne run-up, and on taxiing. 
All large hub airports encounter problems directly related to aprons and 
gates and many have landside access problems. At some airports gate slots are 
already full durlng peak hours thereby prohiblting the expansion of operatlons 
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Figure 3-2. Total Scheduled All-Cargo Operations by Hour 
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Flgure 3-3. U.S. Total Top 100 Alrports Scheduled Operations by Hour 
even if the a1rport quotas are 1ncreased. At other airports the apron/gate 
layouts are such that they cannot accommodate a large wingspan a1rcraft unless 
the adjacent gate positions are empty or are occupied by a small a1rcraft. The 
current sltuation is therefore llm1ting, placing restr1ctions on the number 
and/or Slze of aircraft that can be accommodated by the current airport system. 
The lmprovements to be realized between now and 1990 are also limiting. At 
a1rports where expansion 1S poss1ble, and provided environmental approval is 
obtained, it appears unlikely that the new aprons and gates will be designed 
for alrcraft signif1cantly larger than the current B-747. There will also be 
1nstallations where the he1ght (vertical tail) and/or length of aircraft will 
be lim1ted by the mand1tory clearance establ1shed by a 7:1 slope originat1ng 
at the centerl1ne of instrumented runways. Any expanS10n of aprons and 
terminals must be such as to relieve or prevent landside congestion keeping 
in mind that cargo moves into and out of the a1rport during the hours of peak 
passenger traffic and c01ncident with the local rush hour traffic. 
Although the FAA has identif1ed the need for at least 10 new metropolitan 
alrports it is unlikely that there will be any such construct1on until the 
1990's. Over th1S same per10d expanS10ns will be llmited to terminals and 
runway extensions at a few maJor hub airports. Whether the a1rport is new 
or expand1ng, development will be constrained by environmental requirements 
along w1th capital and land ava1lab1lity. For at least the next decade the air 
cargo industry must operate within the framework of a domestic airport system 
that is not slgnif1cantly 1mproved over today's a1rports. Operators w1ll 
encounter 1ncreas1ng airside delays and congestion that could exaggerate the 
fuel problems. Unless counterveiling act10n is taken the growth 1n air cargo 
will be hand1capped by the retardation of new flights from the grow1ng number 
of congested a1rports. A partial solution to th1S problem would be to 1ncrease 
the number of direct flights between uncongested airports 1nstead of trans-
ferring at the congested hub airports. The problem would also be reduced 1f 
the airlines spread their transfer operations over many smaller hubs rather 
than a few superhubs. Such reduct10n and spread1ng of transfer traff1c will 
reduce the need for a super-large a1rcraft but will increase the need for a 
sllghtly above average a1rcraft size. 
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All cargo operat1ons could be established at general aviat10n airports, 
at surplus mil1tary bases or by j01nt use of mil1tary airports. Each choice 
has a un1que set of soc1al, political, physical, technical and economic 
cons1derations that must be resolved based upon location. Among these consid-
erations 1S the time and distance to the area's center of commerce, surface 
transport ava1lable, and the transfer of belly cargo (currently about 54 per-
cent of the world air cargo movement) to and from the passenger a1rport. In 
the case of a new dedicated cargo airport it 1S doubtful that revenues would 
be adequate to pay operat1ng expenses plus debt retirement. However, whether 
for m1xed or ded1cated operations the design of new, or the modification of 
exist1ng, a1rports must be closely coord1nated with the a1rcraft industr1es 
des1gn studies of future der1vative and new aircraft. 
Terminals, Ground Handling and Conta1ners 
The cargo terminal is the element in the air cargo system Wh1Ch controls 
and directs cargo movement and accomplishes interline transfers and the 1nter-
change between air and surface modes. In itself the term1nal is a complex 
man-machine system operat1ng within the airport environment and effecting and 
affected by the 1nterfac1ng system elements. To assess these cross 1mpacts 
and establ1sh an 1nterface w1th the 1990 scenario, on-s1te observations, 
statist1cal surveys, and analysis were conducted of 20 terminals located at 
the f1ve study a1rports and operated by seven different airlines. 
Results of the terminal analysis revealed a wide var1at1on in product1v1ty 
as illustrated 1n Figure 3-4. This performance is due to operational procedures 
as affected by cargo flow d1rection, quant1ty, and selectiv1ty; air and surface 
vehicle scheduling; facil1ty and equipment capab1l1ties; personnel performance 
and costs; plus government constraints. Most of the main hub term1nals are 
operating at 70 to 80 percent capacity and nearly all are limited in physical 
expansion by airport restrictions and/or the availability of adJoin1ng land. 
These terminals cannot meet the forecast cargo flow levels for 1990 at current 
levels of mechanization and handl1ng procedures. 
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F1gure 3-4. Monthly Cargo Flow Var1ations 
To meet the 1990 flow levels with available terminals will require the 
productivity levels achievable w1th increased mechan1zat1on, conta1nerizat1on, 
and rev1sed handl1ng procedures. These revis10ns also prov1de an opportun1ty 
for reducing the 1nd1rect operating costs (IOC). The product1vity per manhour 
for various types of cargo terminal process1ng equ1pment and operat1ons 1S 
shown in Figure 3-5. The least productive operations are bU1ldup/breakdown 
while the most productive are those performed by the elevating transfer vehicle 
(ETV), F1gure 3-6, and the transporter. The close proxim1ty of the latter 
shows that the level of dim1n1sh1ng returns on manpower reduct10n 1S reached 
once the term1nal's functional operations are mechan1zed. However, further 
mechanizat10n can 1ncrease capac1ty for a glven floor area. Although not shown 
in Figure 3-5, conveyers may be an aid to buildup/breakdown, however, the large 
var1at1ons 1n size and types of fre1ght tendered by the sh1pper present a 
severe hand1cap to complete automated sorting. Conveyers on-board the a1rcraft, 
such as the propr1etory, automat1c latch1ng concept shown in Flgure 3-7, can 
reduce the loadlng manpower by as much as 500 percent. Both the termlnal and 
aircraft handling systems are achlevable with current technology, provide for 
intermlxed handllng of air and marltime containers, and ellmlnate the current 
440 kllogram (969 pounds) slave pallet currently requlred for handllng maritime 
containers onboard the alrcraft. 
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Figure 3-6. High Mechanizatlon Elevatlng Transfer Vehicle 
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Figure 3-7. Loading-Bar Concept for Handling Alr and Surface Contalners 
The floor area requirements associated wlth the mechanized functions 
exercised ln buildup, breakdown, temporary shortage, and staging of unlt load 
devices (ULOls) no larger than 2.4x2.4x3.2 meters (SxSxlO feet) type M contalners 
are presented in Figure 3-S. As mechanizatlon lncreases the required floor 
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Figure 3-S. Area Requlrements for Buildup, Breakdown and Staglng 
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area decreases and/or the number of ULD's handled 1ncreases. Triple-level ETV 
stacking w1th longitudinally oriented space for ULD buildup or breakdown reduce 
the required floor area 70 percent compared to the dolly system. Such area 
reductions are extremely important to 1nternational term1nals where the average 
1mport storage 1nterval 1S about three days. It 1S unlikely that this storage 
can be reduced below 1.5 days without the 1nstitution of preclearance procedures 
through lnternat10nal agreements. However, decreasing import storage from 
3 to 1.5 days ln a mechan1zed bulk term1nal w1ll increase the processible flow 
capacity by 22 percent. 
Term1nal surveys have consistantly shown poor ut1lization of ULD volume 
due to t1me of tender, inadequate bU1ldup techniques, and cargo selectiv1ty. 
However, model tests and computer analysis has shown that cube utilizations 
(sum of cargo p1ece volumes ~ ULD inter10r volume) up to 90 percent are 
practically achlevable as shown 1n Figure 3-9. It 1S expected that rev1sions 
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F1gure 3-9. Achievable Maximum Cube Ut1lizat1on 
1n ULD loading comb1ned w1th increased ava1lab1l1ty and select1vity of pieces 
assoc1ated with the grow1ng cargo market w1ll make these levels of cube ut1li-
zatlon achievable by 1990. Ava1lab1l1ty and selectiv1ty can be enhanced by 
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tariff structures that make allowances for a deferred level of service at lower 
rates thus malntainlng a cargo backlog for opportunity fill-in. Increasing the 
mean cube utllization from the current 54 percent to 90 percent can reduce the 
number of ULD's handled by approximately 10 percent, a favorable contrlbutlon 
to making the eXlstlng termlnal flt the future cargo flow. The resulting In-
crease ln loaded densitles will have the added beneflt of increasing revenues, 
decreaslng the tare welght/cargo weight ratio, and lncreaslng the airlift energy 
efflclency. However, consideration must also be given to the resulting lncreased 
loads on the alrcraft floor, fuselage shell, and upon the payload design density 
for new aircraft. 
A bulk termlnal lncorporatlng the preceding mechanization and operational 
changes is illustrated in Figure 3-10. It is anticipated that such termlnal 
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Flgure 3-10. 50 Percent Bulk Terminal High Mechanlzation 
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w1ll encompass computerized documentation management to 1nclude b1lling; cargo 
routing, schedul1ng, and trac1ng to min1mize interline transfer; flight 
scheduling; aircraft loading; storage scheduling; and customs documentat1on 
and clearance. Areas are prov1ded for both bulk and customer loaded container 
(CLC) processing. The latter is of great benefit because CLC's eliminate the 
area and manpower 1ntensive bU1ldup and breakdown functions, they rapidly 
improve productivity even with low mechanization. The 1mpact of CLC's on 
terminal and personnel costs are shown 1n Figure 3-11. G01ng from the current 
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Figure 3-11. Operat1onal Cost and Personnel Var1at1on for All-Cargo Carr1er 
40 percent CLC's to 70 percent reduces personnel and terminal costs by 60 and 
25 percent respect1vely. Reduc1ng 1mport storage from 3 to 1.5 days and 
elim1nat1ng bulk flow through the term1nals provides additional 5 percent and 
10 percent reductions 1n personnel and terminal costs respect1vely. The 100 
percent conta1ner flow can be ach1eved through offsite bulk processing and 
CLC's. The latter shifts bU1ldup/breakdown functions to the forwarders/shippers 
that must be compensated for by 1ncent1ve tar1ffs. Although offsite processing 
by the a1rl1nes could requ1re some 1ncrease 1n personnel and some duplicat10n 
of equ1pment 1t moves the area 1ntens1ve functions to lower cost land leaving 
the h1gh cost a1rport area free for stag1ng and a1rcraft 10ad1ng and unloading. 
It also can reduce the landside truck traffic by a factor of 10 or more. 
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inc adO[)tH'n of mecharllztltlcn will be achleved progresslVely and conSlstant 
wlth the grC'I','th 111 mdrket demJ.nd, level of trunsfer operatlons, and the quantlty 
of CLC' So 1-\5 we n,ove out 1 nto the future the quantity of CLC IS wlll lncrease to 
SO per'cent of the total alr cargo flow by 1990. At that pOlnt ln tlme the bulk 
proces~lng ared, reference Figure 3-10, will have nearly dlsappeared. ThlS 
progressive development of termlnals will culmlnate ln the mechanized 2.4x2.4x6 
meter (8x8x20 foot) M2 contalner termlnal, 111ustrated ln Figure 3-12, to serve 
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Flgure 3-12. Hlgh-Mechanlzatlon M-2 Container Terminal 
the post 1995 dedicated air cargo alrcraft. Although more costly than hlghly 
mechanized verSlons of present termlnals, these M2 terminals wlll also be 
conslderably more productive and as a consequence cost competitlve on a cargo 
welght flow baS1S as shown in Figure 3-13. Although currently frowned upon by 
the U.S. airlines, additional savings can be realized through the use of JOlnt 
terminals. As an example, the use of a single termlnal by three alrlines 
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F1gure 3-13. All-Cargo Flow/Cost Var1at1on 
would reduce container handling costs and the land area required by 50 percent 
compared to each a1rl1ne operat1ng 1tS own terminal. 
Unt1l the advent of the dedicated cargo a1rcraft, designed to be compat1ble 
with industry preferred containers, terminals w1ll continue to be handicapped 
by the large var1ety of ULD's designed for belly operations and to f1t cargo 
aircraft der1ved from their passenger counterparts. Although containers have 
the advantages of better cube util1zation and 1mproved secur1ty, the pallet 
wlll contlnue to be used by some alrllnes on welght limlted fllghts, ranges 
greater than about 6000 kilometers (3729 statute miles), where the three to 
four times less tare weight 1S a major concern. As the a1r cargo service 
lmproves and 1ntermodel operat1ons, such as a1r br1dges, expand, the air trans-
port of mar1t1me conta1ners w1ll increase in frequency 1n sp1te of the 2.7 to 
2.4 t1mes greater tare we1ghts compared to the comparable 6 and 12 meter (20 
and 40 foot) alr conta1ners. 
As the a1r cargo system expands attention w1ll be directed to 1mproving 
the compatibil1ty of containers not only with a1r operat1ons and termlnals but 
also with shippers and cons1gnees and with the intermed1ate surface transport 
llnks. Additional certification requlrements w1ll be imposed on design and 
construct1on which, when met, will allow the result1ng sealed, tamper-proof 
conta1ners to cross all common borders of partic1pating countries without 
be1ng opened for customs 1nspections. Advances 1n material and manufactur1ng 
technlques will result 1n 30 percent reduct10ns 1n tare weight and manufacturing 
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cC"j or !ntcrmodal conta1ners. One such concept, shown 1n F1guI'e 3-14, 1S 
cur, 2,11 iy be1ng developed by the McDonnell Douglas Corporat1on. The grow1ng 
Flgure 3-14. MDAC 40-Foot Isogr1d Intermodal Conta1ner 
use of conta1ners, a necessary approach to assure efficient 1ntermodal opera-
t1ons, w1ll st1mulate the development of un1que, hybr1d conta1ner designs that 
are comprom1ses between secur1ty and we1ght. Included in these des1gnes w1ll 
be modular conflgurations d1rected to reduc1ng 1nter and 1ntral1ne transfer 
operatlons whlle malntalning load lntegrity. 
Alr Networks 
The route network wlth 1tS associated orlgins and dest1nations combines 
with operational frequency to provide the necessary service to meet the grow-
1ng a1r cargo market demand. The follow1ng dlScusslon addresses possible 
future changes In thlS serVlce postulated to occur due to potentlal variations 
In internatlonal economlCS and lnstltutional patterns. 
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The network formed by the worldwide scheduled all-cargo airport-pairs for 
August 1978 is shown in Figure 3-15. The greatest change in this network will 
Figure 3-15. Scheduled All-Cargo Airport - Pairs, OAG August 1978 
occur in U.S. Domes~ic routes where the impact of deregulation will materialize 
over the next 3 to 5 years. During this period the expansion of existing and 
the entry of new airlines, both cargo and communter, will provide a prolifera-
tion of the number of cities served. The result will be a 15 percent increase 
in cities served at stage lengths less than 3000 kilometers (1865 statute miles). 
To avoid an increase in the air traffic at already congested major domestic 
hubs there will be a diffusion and an increase in the number of transfer hubs 
thus reducing the need for very large aircraft to handle inter-hub tfaffic. 
Such changes in the air network have the potential to affect changes in domestic 
commerce including a shift in the location of some activities. As an example, 
the shift from distributed to central warehousing. 
Due to international agreements potential changes in the international 
network are less apparent. In the event there is a revision of the approach 
to such factors as frequency, routing, gauge change, and Fifth Freedom cargo 
throughput in multilateral agreements, there should be an accompanying increase 
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in cargo flow over ranges less than 5000 kilometers (3100 statute miles). 
Changes in the principles of such agreements will facilitate network revisions 
employing the hub-spoke and itinerary routing concepts. 
In the hub-spoke concept cargo is delivered to the hub by surface mode or 
by short-haul aircraft, is consolidated, and proceeds to the destination hub 
aboard a larger, long range, cargo aircraft. This approach has the potential, 
as illustrated in Figure 3-16, to substantially reduce, or eliminate, the 
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F1gure 3-16. Hub Concept - Backhau1 Balance (1000 Tonnes) 
backhau1 problem so preve1ent in current international operations. In this 
example the hub cities, New York, San Francisco, Par1s, Bogota, and Tokyo, 
are fed by spokes to the surrounding countries noted in the figure. The 
quantities of air cargo that moved between hub countr1es during 1976 are given 
in the boxes and show the 1mbalance in exports to France and Colombia, and in 
imports from Japan. When the spoke flows are added, given in the solid circles. 
the imbalance with France 1S greatly reduced and reversed in the case of 
Colombia. In the case of Japan, combining the hub and spoke flows exaggerated 
the 1976 imbalance. However, based upon the 1990 forecast cargo flows, dashed 
c1rcles, the imbalance w1th Japan was sh1fted to the export side. These data 
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indicate that air cargo sales efforts working in unison with implementation of 
the hub-spoke operations could do much to relieve back-haul problems in the 
future. Acceptance of the hub-spoke concept in international operations would 
tend to shift emphasis to larger aircraft and to all-cargo airports. However, 
dedicated airports, being separated from passenger operations, would give rise 
to difficulties in the transfer of belly-pit cargo. 
Section 4 
SYSTEM SERVICE, ECONOMICS AND MARKET DEMAND 
The air cargo industry grew substantially over the six years prior to 
1976 with revenue tonne-kilometers increasing at average annual rates of 
5 percent domestically, 9 percent internationally and 14 percent in the 
foreign markets, while tariffs (rates) declined 1.6 percent in real terms. 
However, with todays perspective this industry appears to be in its infancy 
with the largest growth yet to come. To bring about this growth and the 
required system changes intelligently and effectively will require advanced 
and comprehensive planning. This section, therefore, examines a key element 
of this planning effort, the relation between system service, economics and 
cargo market demand as affected by the infrastructure and the transport1ng 
aircraft. 
Rate and Service Elasticity 
An elasticisty model was developed and exerc1sed to exam1ne the relation-
ship between market demand and a1r cargo rates for all-cargo operations. 
Application of th1S model over the per10d 1968 to 1976 provided the results 
shown 1n F1gure 4-1. Except for the oil embargo years, 1974 and 1975, the 
model estimated demands were very close to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) 
actuals. As Gross National Product (GNP) increased the demand, revenue tonne-
kilometers (RTK), increased and was accompanled by a steady decrease in real 
airfre1ght rates. Since 1973 the real domestlc alrfrelght rates have behaved 
erratically thus contrlbutlng to some of the variations ln demand. The slopes 
of the GNP and Yleld scales show that market demand has been more influenced 
by GNP and much less slgniflcantly by changes in air cargo yield/service. 
This supports the common thesis that past market demand has been relatively 
inelastic wlth respect to air cargo rates. 
Utlllzlng the model the questlon of elastlcitles was investigated 1n detail. 
Results showed GNP to be the most lmportant influenclng factor w1th a demand 
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Figure 4-1. Cargo Flow as a Function of Gross Natlonal Product. 
Airfreight Rates and Service 
elasticity of +2.2 for all-cargo operations. The next most significant factor 
was the air rate wlth an elasticity coefficient of -1.3 followed by truck 
tariffs with a coefficient of +0.1. 
Due to the lack of data. a research technique known as ConJoint measurement 
was employed to produce utility measures of air cargo service. Figure 4-2 
presents the results of a commercial market research study with the ordinate 
being a normalized measure of relative utility. As delivery time and tariffs 
increase the utility of air decreases. Delivery time is based upon shipping 
at the close of business and shows that a noon delivery. 19 hours later. is 
worth only 60 percent of a 9:00 a.m. delivery. In terms of elasticity these 
data provide a coefficient of -3 percent thus supporting the marketing 
phllosophy that overnight delivery of airfreight is a differentiated product. 
As the number of destinations (cities served) increase the utility of air 
transport lncreases. however. the effect is considerably less than for either 
tariffs or time (Figure 4-2). These data lndicate a demand coefficient of 
+1.5 associated with increased destinations. This value along with those 
discussed above are presented in order of importance in the following listing. 
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Figure 4-2. Relative Ut1lity of Del1very Time, Tariff and Number of Cities 
Values shown provide the percentage change in demand resulting from a +10 per-
cent change in the causal variables. 
Causal Var1ables Change in Market Demand (%l 
GNP 22 
Air Cargo Tar1ffs -13 
Delivery Time -3 
Cities Served 1.5 
Truck Tariffs 1 
System Economics 
Between the years 1972 to 1974 the CAB conducted an in-depth 1nvestigat1on, 
Domestic Airfreight Rate Investigation (DAFRI), of the cost elements associated 
w1th air cargo operations. Although the result1ng multielement rate structure 
1S no longer applicable under deregulation, the work represents the most 
comprehensive study of capac1ty and noncapacity causative cost factors with 
a maJor achievement being the definition of noncapacity terminal costs. The 
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resulting rate structures, updated to 1977, were employed to perform detailed 
analysis of the elements of total operating cost (TOC) and their relatlon to 
short- and long-term rate making. 
Despite the growth of the air cargo market and a cost structure that has 
exhibited 1ncreasing returns to scale, cargo carriers have not been able to 
achleve the consistant prof1ts necessary to induce the capital investments 
required to serve future growth. Profits can be increased through reductions 
1n the indirect (IOC) and d1rect operating costs (DOC). Encompassed within the 
former are the costs associated with the terminal which can amount to 28 to 83 
percent of the total revenue depending upon the range flown. Term1nal improve-
ments provide the added incentive of avoiding the terminal saturation discussed 
in Section 3 and illustrated by the domest1c terminal data of Figure 4-3. Even 
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F1gure 4-3. u.S. Domestic Terminal Productivity vs Tonnes 
if the 6 percent annual improvement in product1vity real1zed over the past six 
years continues until 1990 the terminal capacity associated with the current 
bulk processing approach will fall far short of the capacity required to meet 
the forecast 9.5 percent average annual domestic market growth. However, by 
gOing to 90 percent shipper loaded containers and vertical storage the necessary 
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throughput capac1ty would be achieved w1th no 1ncrease in terminal area and 
would prov1de a 23 percent reduction in IOC. This sav1ng is prlmarlly due to 
manpower, the gain due to technically lmproved handllng equipment, such as 
elevatlng transport vehlcles (ETV), 1S much smaller provlding an add1tional 
6 percent reduction in IOC. 
The lmprovement in returns to scale realized ln the past is forecast to 
continue as lllustrated ln Figure 4-4. ThlS lmprovement when applled to the 
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Flgure 4-4. Indirect Operatlng Cost vs Revenue Tonne 
areas of ~ales promotion and corporate staff provides a 15 percent reduction 
in IOC. Very few people must be added in the sales and management staffs to 
accommodate a large increase in revenue tonnes. 
As these and other lnfrastructure developments are implemented there will 
be a Sh1ft 1n the relative 1mportance of the respective elements making up the 
total tariff. This behavior is illustrated by the results shown below. 
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Year 
Direct Operating Cost (DOC) 
Indirect Operating Cost (IOC) 
Profit (Before Taxes) 
Tariff 
Percent 
1976 1990 
57 69 
39 24 
4 8 
100 100 
Increases in the price of fuel above the 48 cents per liter (181 cents per 
U.S. gallon) forecast for 1994, will exaggerate the difference between DOC 
and 10C. The increasing importance of DOC will force increased emphasis on 
aeronautical technology and design on the one hand and improved aircraft 
utilization (scheduling) on the other. 
As discussed in Section 1, Competitive Modes, the air cargo industry is 
capital intensive, a fact partially responsible for the cargo industries poor 
profit picture. The reason for this becomes evident when the cost factors for 
scheduled all-cargo service are grouped according to their relationship to the 
system as illustrated by the 1976 data below. 
Flight Related Costs 49% 
Payload Related Costs 33% 
Investment Related Costs 13% 
Management Related Costs 5% 
Total Operating Cost 100% 
The investment related costs, 13 percent in 1976, can be expected to become 
even more significant with the potential to affect the types, size and number of 
-
aircraft desired by the 1ndustry. This 1S illustrated in Figure 4-5 which compares 
a new, military/commercial cargo aircraft to the current B747-200. While the new 
a1rcraft shows a fuel consumption improvement of about 4 percent its DOC is 10 per-
cent greater due to the increased cost of depreciation associated with the more 
expensive new aHcraft. Factors affecting depreciation include aircraft price, 
util1zation, useful llfe, and payload. Price is the more powerful of these factors 
and is directly related to the number of aircraft produced as illustrated in Figure 
4-5. The importance of increasing the production run and of decreasing development 
and production costs to achieving an economically viable aircraft program cannot be 
overemphasized. The reduced fuel costs achieved with a new a1rcraft can be more 
than offset by the accompanying increases in depreciation and insurance. 
60 
115 
STAGE LENGTH 4500 km 
110 
DOC 105 
RATIO ADVANCED 
AIRCRAFT/B747-Z00 
- PERCENT 
100 
RELATIVE ,IARKET SIZE 
95 
90 0 100 300 400 500 
RELATIVE PRICE OR MARKET - 100 PERCENT 
Figure 4-5. Relative Direct Operating Cost vs Relative Fuel Price and 
Advanced Aircraft Market Slze 
The effect of an advanced technology, dedicated cargo aircraft on fleet 
economics was determined on the basis of a 154 tonne (169.7 ton) payload air-
craft entering service in 1990. Over a 10 year period this aircraft could 
capture at least 45 percent of the cargo market and would have a fuel consump-
tion 29 percent below that of the B747-200. Values of DOC were first derived 
using the standard modified ATA method and based on a production of 200 air-
craft. The resulting costs were then adjusted by factors to relate the calcu-
lated values to real world values. These adjustment factors were determined 
on the basis of actual airline experience in- operating the 8747-200. Except 
for the depreciation and insurance elements the adjustments were small. The 
resulting reduction in DOC of the advanced technology a1rcraf~ compared to the 
B747-200 varied between 23 and 13 percent as respectively determined by the 
ATA and adjustment methods of computation. 
Perturbing the DOC analysis showed that one of the largest benefits occur-
ring to the 1990 system could be realized by increasing the average aircraft 
load factor from the current 65 percent to 70 percent. Th1S could be real1zed 
through improved cube ut1lization (54 to 85 percent) and aircraft loading as 
discussed 1n the preced1ng section. This change alone would provide a 7 per-
cent reduction in DOC without addit10nal 1nvestment. 
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It is anticipated that a coordinated effort will occur between the FAA, 
airport authorlties, the airllnes and the aircraft manufacturers in the integra-
tion of new technology and lntermodal capabilities. The resulting aircraft/ 
airport compatibillty improvements in operations will provide an additional 
4 percent reduction in IOC. Additional reductions in IOC can be reallzed, as 
previously dlscussed, through the increase in CLC's, 23 percent; improved 
termlnal mechanization and handling procedures, 6 percent; and through economies 
of scale relative to management and sales staffs, 15 percent. Terminal 
reductlons were based upon the data of Section 3. 
In total, the proceeding future changes can result in a 20 to 30 percent 
reduction in DOC and a 48 percent reduction in IOC as noted in the first two 
columns of Table 4-1. Translating these values into fleet reductions in the 
TABLE 4-1. 
POTENTIAL COST AND TARIFF REDUCTIONS 
Percent Reductions 
Year 
Possible Improvements DOC roc TOC Tariffs 
1978·1985 
Increased Afrcraft load Factor (65~701) 7 4 4 
Shipper· loaded Containers (90%) 23 10 9 
Reduced Terminal Storage (3-1 5 days) 
with Vertical Storage and Improved 
Handling Equipment 
6 2 2 
I-
Sub Total 16 15 
11985.2000 
Improved Aircraft/Airport Compatibility 4 1 1 
Economy of Scale (Avg Annual Total 
Ca r90 Ma rket Growth of 10 71) 15 6 6 
Advanced Technology Oedicated 13·23 7·12 3·6 Freighter 
Sub Total 14·19 10·13 
IncrellSN Aid fne Profit 
·4 
Totals 20·30 48 30·35 21·24 
1990 to 2000 operating environment, with adjustments for the proflt element 
and the fact that the advanced aircraft make up less than half the fleet, 
results in the TOC and tariff reductions presented in columns three and four. 
Comblning the potential tariff reductions with a 4 percent increase in proflt 
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to stabilize airline earnings results in a potential net tariff reduction of 
21 to 24 percent. Attention is called to the fact that changes possible in 
the pre-1985 period can be achieved with currently available technology yet 
produce potential tariff reductions as great as those achievable in the 1985 
to 2000 period w1th advanced technology. Because advanced freighter concepts 
will make up only a part of the total fleet for many years following the1r 
introduction only 3 to 6 percent of the tariff reduction 1S traceable directly 
to these advanced freighters. 
It is quite likely that a portion of the tariff reduction identified in 
Table 4-1 will be absorbed for increased profits and/or incentive tariffs 
directed toward increasing customer-loaded conta1ners, productivity, container 
volumetric utilization, and aircraft load factors. Such 1ncentives will be 
stimulated by the innovative challenges of the new domestic entrants under 
deregulation. 
In the light of the potential cost reductions to be derived through system 
changes, the d1rect and indirect operating costs were investigated from the 
standpoints of "by-product" (belly pit) and "joint cost" (all-cargo) costing 
approaches. The cost criteria used was the minimum the operator would be 
will1ng to accept over the short and long run respectively. Results showed 
the range of "rational" tariffs to vary by a factor greater than 6, based upon 
a bulk shipment of 1000 kilograms (2203 pounds) and 49 p1eces over 4500 k1lo-
meters (2797 statute miles). These data illustrate the thinking underlying 
the reduced belly cargo rates offered by some combination carriers since 
deregulat1on. For the all cargo carrier, tar1ffs must be sufficient to recover 
all costs (flight, payload, investment and management related) while the 
combinat1on carr1ers can rationalize some degree of marginal cost1ng in the 
llght of thelr passenger revenues. 
In general, there has been llttle eVldence of aggresslve tariff reductions 
almed at increasing the cargo market. At best a partial explanation of this 
behaV10r can be seen 1n the industries perception of rate elasticity. Based 
upon an equity rat10 of 45 percent and an interest rate of 8.5 percent the 
current market would favor price increases over decreases at pr1ce elasticlties 
less than -1.33. Slnce individual industry members preceive elasticities 
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less than one there is no temptation to reduce pr1ces but rather to increase 
them 1n an attempt to maximize profits to provide adequate returns or to 
facilitate further growth. Long run rate making behavior will be even more 
conservative because volume-inducing rate reductions will be made only in 
h1ghly elastic markets, price elasticities greater than -3. Therefore, in the 
future there w1ll be a strong general tendency in the industry toward tariff 
stability with increased profits and improved return on investment (ROI). 
Cargo Market Demand 
The air cargo market forecast to the year 2008 was developed in two phases. 
The first phase developed the baseline total scheduled airfreight market fore-
cast based upon a sound background of current and past operations, including 
regional traffic flows (city-pair and country-pair) for the u.s. Domestic, 
U.S. International, and 44 Foreign carrier markets. Econometric behavioral 
equations were developed for each market considering GNP growth, inflation, 
currency rates, and 1nter-model price ratios. Compounded annual growth rates 
of 9.5, 8.3 and 14.3 percent were derived for the U.S. Domestic, U.S. Inter-
national and Foreign markets respect1vely. The higher growth rate of the 
foreign market is due to the anticipated increased trade with and between the 
currently underdeveloped regions of the world. The larger portion of this 
trade will be captured by foreign airlines. 
The second phase developed the forecast for the all-cargo portion of the 
market. In this phase the baseline forecast was modified to account for system 
induced growth and the mail and express components of the cargo market. System 
induced growth was based upon the system changes and elasticities discussed 
earlier in th1S section. Additional changes considered included the market 
lmpact induced by the 1mproved service prov1ded through increasing the number 
of cities served and reducing the average import storage time from three to 
It days. W1th the exception of the impact of 1ncreased airline profit, the 
induced growth factors were all posltive ranging from a plus 1.3 percent due 
to aircraft-airport compatib1l1ty to 11 percent for achieving 90 percent sh1pper 
loaded conta1ners. 
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One of the more important factors affecting the sizing of future alf 
freighters 1S the expected market share to be carr1ed 1n these all-cargo alr-
craft. For the three markets combined, the weighted all-cargo share was fore-
cast to increase from 44 percent in 1978 to 60 percent by the year 2000. Th1S 
16 percent 1ncrease was considered a viable change over the 22 year period. 
The resultlng forecasts for each of the three markets are presented 1n 
Figure 4-6. The associated average annual compound growth rates for the 
300 
20n 
AVERAGE ANNUAL GROWTH RATE 
250 U 5 DOMESTIC 8 6 U 5 INTERNATIONAL 7 9 
FOREIGN 12 0 
150 
'" 
200 
'" ~ 8 
"" 150 ~ l- I-0: 100 0: 
'" '" ~ z « 100 15 
'" '" 5 ::E =:> 
u 50 u 
50 
0 
1978 1980 1990 2000 2008 
CALENDAR YEAR 
F1gure 4-6. Air Cargo Market Demand Forecast for All-Cargo A1rcraft 
period 1978 to 2008 are 8.6 percent for u.s. Domestic, 7.9 percent for U.S. 
International, and 12 percent for the Foreign market. The average annual 
compound growth rate for all three markets combined is 10.7 percent. To realize 
th1S growth will requ1re a concentrated sales effort by the air cargo lndustry 
conducted in an atmosphere of providlng serV1ce and meeting the needs of the 
shipper. Any mean1ngfull expansion of the air cargo share of the total world 
fre1ght movement w1ll requ1re the cultivat10n of high volume shipments on a 
regular bas1s as already pointed out in the preced1ng sections. 
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Sectlon 5 
FUTURE AIR CARGO AIRCRAFT 
The final task of the CLASS directed attentlon to the Future Requlrements 
of Dedicated Freighter Alrcraft to Year 2008. Recognizlng that a lower direct 
operatlng cost is not a sufficient criterian upon WhlCh to base a deC1Slon 
regarding the selection of a speclfic aircraft design, lnvestlgatlons also 
consldered the lnterrelatlons wlth the system infrastructure, lnstltutional 
barriers, and system economics. Among the economic parameters consldered were 
the alrline investment required, the accompanYlng levels of cash flow and 
operating lncome, and the return on investment to the alrlines and aircraft 
manufacturers. These parameters along with fleet mix and aircraft character-
lstics were evaluated using the Douglas Future Requirements and Advanced Market 
Evaluation (FRAME) slmulatlon program outllned in Flgure 5-1. The input model 
CARGO SYSTEM MODEL STUDY AIRCRAFT 
NETWORK FORECAST CONSTRAINTS CURRENT I DERIVATIVE 1 ADVANCED 
AUG 1978 OAG MARKETS FREQUENCY 1970 I 1980 I 1990 ALL-JET DEMAND UTILIZATION TECHNOLOGY CARGO 
AIRPORT-PAIRS LOAD FACTOR IOC = PERCENT LroES}ANOCOST~ DISTRIBUTED IN OF REVENUE 322 KM (200 SM) TRIPS DEPRECIATION INCREMENTS TARIFFS INFLATION SUBROUTINE 
t + 
FRAME AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS 
----.. 
OPERATION PAYLOAD 
AND RANGE 
ECONOMIC SPEED 
ANALYSIS PRICE 
! TRIP COSTS 
FLEET MIX 
ANNUAL TIME PERIOD 
UNITS 1: INVESTMENT 
ARTKM 1: OPER INCOME (ARTSM) 
REVENUE ROI 
COST EQUIVALENT PROFIT UNIFORM ANNUAL 
TRIPS CASH FLOW 
Figure 5-1. Future Requirements and Aircraft Market Evaluation - FRAME 
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encompassed the world air cargo network shown 1n Figure 3-15, forecast network 
characterist1c and constra1nts, and the all-cargo market demand presented 1n 
F1gure 4-6. 
Slmulation of the world a1r cargo network prov1ded the means for competi-
t1vely determ1ning the fleet of current type aircraft to the year 1992. Sub-
sequently this fleet competed with the new derivative configurations proJected 
to enter airline service in 1985 thus defining the fleet of current and deriva-
tive aircraft to compete with the new dedicated freighters to become operational 
in 1995. Results of these competitive fleet analysis provide solut1ons based 
upon the optimum use of available aircraft operatlng over the world alr cargo 
network and upon the forecast market demand and system variables. However, 
one must bear in mind that exterior forces acting in the future environment 
could cause the airlines to deviate from the aircraft acquisition and disposal 
sequences noted herein. The results do provide a viable guide to preferred 
action. 
Current Aircraft 1978-1992 
Analysis of th~ current aircraft fleet considered fifteen generic types 
of all-cargo Jet aircraft which fell into three distinct size categories. 
Averaging the capabilities and characteristics within each of these categories 
lead to the identification of the three representative models defined in the 
following table. 
REPRESENTATIVE AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS 
Design Design Cruise 
Types Range- Payload- Speed-
Model Represented KM (SM) Tonnes(Tons) M 
Al Small Narrow- 3806 (2356) 14.2 (15.6) 0.78 
Bodies (7 Types) 
A2 Large Narrow- 5149 (3200) 42.9 (47.3) 0.80 
Bodies (5 Types) 
A3 Wide-Bodies 7023 (4364) 94.7 (104.5) 0.85 
(3 Types) 
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The analysis of current aircraft was extended out to the year 1992 based 
upon the most effective fleet utilization of the three representative aircraft. 
If available either as new and/or as re-engined passenger aircraft conversions, 
the number of Al and A2 units could increase 20 and 60 percent respectively as 
shown in Flgure 5-2. The Al phases out in the early 80's and the A2's reach 
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Flgure 5-2. Fleet Mix 1978-1992 Reference Fleet 
a maximum in the mid-80's. As the market demand grows the large narrow-bodies 
replace the small narrow-bodies and are ln turn replaced by the Wide-bodies. 
In the lnternatlonal market DC-10 and B747 combl alrcraft (cargo and passengers 
on main deck) are being substituted for the A2's and are thus contributing to 
the market growth. In the absence of new more efficlent alrcraft, the number 
of A3's could increase to nearly 400 units by 1992. In splte of the shift to 
larger payload aircraft the cargo market demand is sufficient to result ln a 
continuing increase in fleet departures (trips) amounting to an average annual 
growth rate of about 7 percent. 
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1980 and 1990 Technology 
Based upon the cargo market demand and the reduction in aircraft research, 
development and testing (RD&T) cost due to component carryover and the added 
production of passenger versions, 1t was concluded that the 1985 generation 
a1rcraft would develop as derivat1ves of contemporary configurations. Selection 
of technology developments applicable to these aircraft considered 1980 avail-
ability and the limitations 1mposed by the derivative approach. These 1980 
developments were viewed as an interim step toward achieving the 1990 level 
of technology which will encompass composites 1n primary structure, adhesive 
bond1ng, energy efficient engines, improved airport/aircraft compatibility, 
active flight control, and improved aircraft systems. The incremental changes 
to aircraft design parameters resulting with the 1980 and 1990 levels of 
development are presented below based upon the respect1ve values for contemporary 
wide-body A3 a1rcraft. 
IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENTS 
Incremental Changes Relative To Current Aircraft 
Des1gn LlWP+N LlWSTRU LlL/D LlSFC LlW ENG LlW FURN Ma1nt. Parameters M~r. Cost Cost 
AlC Eng. A/C Eng. 
Derivative 
-8% -11. 2% +4% -8% -2% -1% 1980 Tech 
Dedicated 
-24% -32% +11% -13% -4% -9.5% -14% +7.2% -2% -5% 1990 Tech 
Derivat1ve Aircraft 1984-1998 
To define the size, fleet operations, and economics, of the derivative 
a1rcraft a range of parametr1c models were each competitively evaluated in 
fleet operations against the reference fleet of representative A2 and A3 air-
craft. Payload size was varied between 22.7 and 181.4 tonnes (25 and 200 tons) 
for design ranges of 3219, 5150, and 7025 kilometers (2000, 3200 and 4365 
statute miles). Econom1c evaluations were based upon a manufacturer's break-
even point of 200 units. This was a viable approach Slnce the derivative a1r-
craft would undoubtedly be produced in passenger versions which would 
substant1ally increase the production run. 
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Results of the economlC analysis of the derivative aircraft are presented 
in Figure 5-3. These data deflne the economlC worth of the preferred models 
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Flgure 5-3. Economlc Worth - Derlvative Aircraft, 1980 Technology 
and Slzes of alrcraft determlned on the basls of maximlzlng the airline return 
on investment (ROI) wlth the derivatlve aircraft operating ln competitlon wlth 
the current A2 and A3 alrcraft. Also shown are the corresponding fleet values 
of the equivalent unlform cash flow (EUACF) and the sum of lnvestment present 
value (rIPV). Due to technology advances the prlce and trlp cost of these 
derivative alrcraft would be reduced 15 and 20 percent respectlvely relatlve 
to a comparable current wlde-body alrcraft vlewed ln 1984 dollars. 
Although the preferred payload was 149.7 tonnes (165 tons) at all ranges, 
reduclng the payload to 91 tonnes (100 tons) would reduce the ROJ by less than 
one percent. The economlcally preferred derlvatlve program would entall the 
development of both the short (SRD) and long range (LRD) models. This combi-
nation would lncrease the alrllne ROI four percentage pOlnts and decrease the 
alrllne lnvestment by 20 percent relative to the reference fleet of A2 and A3 
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a1rcraft. In add1tion, this combination would bring the airline ROI up to 
15 percent, the level often identif1ed as a des1rable economic object1ve. This 
performance would make the derivative an attractive addit10n to the post-1985 
fleet. As evidenced in Figure 5-3 there would be little penalty associated 
with producing only the medium range derivative (MRD). However, consider1ng 
the number of manufacturers currently producing wide-body aircraft it appears 
quite likely that more than one model w1ll be produced. It is equally likely 
that these developed a1rcraft w1ll d1ffer in design range. 
The fleet mix that evolved following introduction of the SRD/LRD combina-
t10n 1n 1985 1S shown in F1gure 5-4. Although there is a steady increase in 
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F1gure 5-4. 1984-1998 SRD/LRD Fleet Mix 
the number of derivative aircraft the number of wide-body A3's also increased 
to a maX1mum of about 150 un1ts in the m1d-80's as they began to take over 
from the large narrow A2 aircraft on the shorter routes. However, if ref1tted 
w1th more eff1C1ent eng1nes that are compatible with future noise regulations 
the A2 a1rcraft could remain in service unt1l 1998. 
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The der1vative aircraft began to replace the A3's 1n the late 80's reach-
ing the number of units tabulated below. Although the derivative program is 
Year 
Number of SRD 
Number of LRD 
1994 
136 
112 
1998 
210 
176 
clearly economically des1rable from the standpoint of the airlines such may not 
be the case from the viewpo1nt of the manufacturers. In the presence of mult1ple 
manufacturers a considerable number of additional passenger un1ts would have to 
be sold. W1thout such add1tional orders, and/or an increase 1n price that would 
degrade the airline economics, the ROI to the manufacturers would be marginal 
making it qU1te unlikely that they would inti tate the development of a new 
ded1cated freighter for the post-1995 time period. 
The exterior dimensions of the 149.7 tonne (165 ton) payload aircraft 
would be very near the limiting values that can be accommodated on existing 
major airports w1thout creating serious interface problems. With this larger 
payload the cargo market growth out to 1998 could be accommodated with an 
average annual frequency growth rate of less than 4 percent compared to a 
6.4 percent growth in the absence of the derivative aircraft. Such operational 
reduction may be a determining factor in selecting a future cargo aircraft to 
be compatible with the antic1pated a1rport congestion discussed 1n Section 3. 
Dedicated Fre1ghter Aircraft 1994-2008 
Analysis of the ded1cated freighters considered that production of these 
a1rcraft would be solely dependent upon the demand generated by cargo operations, 
with no addit10nal sales for passenger operations. The price of all models 
were therefore determined on the basis of both one and two manufacturers and 
on provlding each manufacturer with a 15 percent return on investment as 
determ1ned by the actual number of units required to meet the cargo market 
demand and fleet competition. With this approach compared to the normal break-
even approach the trend with aircraft size is reversed showing increasing 
airline investment and decreas1ng airline ROI with increasing payload. In the 
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basic analysis all considered aircraft incorporated 1990 technology and turbo-
fan engines in comblnation with a low wing, conventional configuration as 
illustrated in Figure 5-5. 
Figure 5-5. Dedicated Civil Cargo Aircraft 
Vlewed ln 1994 dollars the price of the dedicated freighter was 48 percent 
lower than the comparable current A3 wide-body when produced by one manufacturer. 
With two manufacturers thlS reduction in price was decreased to 31 percent. The 
comparable trip cost is not affected by the number of manufacturers and showed 
a 43 percent reduction for the dedicated freighter compared to the A3. 
Fleet performance and economics were investigated parametrically for deslgn 
ranges of 3219 and 7025 kilometers (2000 and 4356 statute miles) for the advanced 
short range (ASR) and long range (ALR) models respectively. Payload size was 
varied between 22.7 and 362.8 tonnes (25 and 400 tons). Preferred sizes of the 
dedlcated frelghters were selected on the basis of maximizing the airline ROI 
as established by fleet performance ln competition wlth the reference fleet of 
A2, A3, SRD and LRD aircraft. Selectlons were based upon a single manufacturer 
since it was established that the number of manufacturers did not effect the 
preferred payload size. 
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The resulting economic worth of the preferred 45.4 tonne (50 ton) payload 
ASR and the 68.0 tonne (75 ton) ALR are presented in Figure 5-6. With one 
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Flgure 5-6. EconomlC Worth - Dedlcated Aircraft, 1990 Technology 
manufacturer the economic performance of the short range ASR was marginal 
providing less than a one percent improvement in airline ROI while reducing 
the required investment by a mere four percent. On the other hand, the long 
range ALR would be extremely desirable providing the airlines a potentlal four 
percent increase in ROI and an 18 percent reduction in investment. This 
performance of the ALR underscores the desirability of a long range aircraft 
to meet the 1994 to 2008 market demand. 
Values of the airline ROI shown in Figure 5-6 are higher than normal 
indicating that the forecast tariff reductions were conservatlve. In actual 
practice the tariffs would be reduced to stimulate the market while still pro-
vlding the alrline a reasonable ROI. As an example, an average annual tariff 
reduction of 1.6 percent over a 10 year period would reduce the airline ROI of 
the reference fleet from the 21.4 to 15 percent and result in a potential two 
percent addltional annual growth in market demand. 
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Considering the number of aircraft requ1red, 1253 ALR's by the year 2008, 
and the changes anticipated 1n the aircraft industry, it is very unlikely that 
only one manufacturer would be involved in supplying this market. As shown in 
F1gure 5-6 the 1ntroduction of a second manufacturer deteriorated the ALR 
program to the point of be1ng less des1rable than the ASR with one manufacturer. 
In the case of dual manufacturers the preferred program entailed the development 
of both the ASR and ALR each by a separate manufacturer. This ASR/ALR comb1na-
t10n prov1ded a two percentage point increase 1n a1rline ROI and a seven percent 
reduct10n 1n investment relative to the reference fleet containing the derivative 
a1rcraft. W1th this level of 1mprovement the desirability of the ASR/ALR combi-
nation program is cons1dered economically marginal. 
The smaller size aircraft were economically preferred because the smaller 
payload increased the number of un1ts required thereby reducing the1r price 
and hence the depreciation and 1nsurance costs to the airlines. However, 
1ntegrat1on of the relatively small payload ASR and ALR aircraft into the fleet 
was accompan1ed by a substant1al increase 1n operat1onal frequency (trips) as 
shown in Figure 5-6. The frequency growth rate of the ASR/ALR combination, 
12.6 percent, was nearly double the growth rate, 6.7 percent, for the reference 
fleet. This behavior was cons1dered a disadvantage that could conflict with 
projected a1rport capac1ties discussed in Sect10n 3 and/or reduce the decrease 
1n IOC, to the forecast level of 24 percent of the total revenue discussed in 
Section 4. To reduce the frequency growth rate of the ded1cated aircraft fleet 
to the 6.7 percent of the reference fleet requ1red increasing the payload of 
the dedicated aircraft to 149.7 tonnes (165 tons). Th1S size aircraft when 
produced by two manufacturers was des1gnated the ALR2. 573 of these aircraft 
would be requ1red by 2008 resulting in the fleet econom1CS shown in Figure 5-6. 
Comparing the ALR2 fleet to the derivat1ve reference fleet indicates that 
the latter would require a nine percent smaller investment while providing 
essentlally the same ROI despite being heavler. and having inferior aerodynam1cs 
and a greater speciflc fuel consumptlon than the ALR2" As discussed in 
Section 4, the lower pr1ce for the derivat1ve aircraft negated the cost 
benefits of the 1990 technology in the dedicated a1rcraft. In addition, 
analysis showed that if the cargo market demand were less than forecast the 
derlvat1ve and dedicated aircraft would be less competit1ve aga1nst the current 
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A3 wide bodies and the undesirable economic effects would be increased in 
severity in the presence of the large dedlcated freighter. Manufacturers and 
airlines would therefore be reluctant to initiate a dedlcated frelghter 
program such as the ASR/ALR or ALR2 over a program of continuing derivative 
improvement. However, the comblneg effects of the cargo market demand, alrport 
and airway development, i~ternational agreements, and mllltary participatlon 
and/or government subSldy may be sufficient to overcome the low economlC 
lncentlve of the dedicated freighter program. 
The fleet mixes that resulted with ASR/ALR combination and the ALR2 air-
craft are presented in Flgure 5-7. Even in competitlon wlth the derivative 
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Figure 5-7. 1978-2008 Fleet M1X 
and dedicated aircraft the current wide-bodies, A3, remained in serVlce as 
late as the year 2005 although they were gradually relegated to shorter range 
operations as the large narrow-bodles, A2, were phased out. In 1994 there 
would be 136 SRD's and 112 LRDls in the fleet. Following the introduction of 
the dedlcated frelghter in 1995 the number of SRD and LRD alrcraft remained 
essentlally unchanged until the late 90 ls when they began to phase out 
decreaslng to a little over 200 unlts by 2008. The number of dedicated 
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freighters steadily increased reaching 949 ASR's and 623 ALR's for a total of 
1572 units by the year 2008. Similar changes would occur if the larger payload 
ALR2 were introduced instead of the smaller ASR/ALR combination. By 2008 the 
number of ALR2
1 s in service reached 570 resulting in a fleet that was 56 per-
cent smaller than the ASR/ALR combination fleet. Such reduction in fleet size 
would have a favorable impact on the anticipated growth in airport congestion. 
Program SUbS1dy. - The 1mpact of subsidy was investigated from the view-
p01nt of developing an advanced dedicated civil-military freighter aircraft. 
It was postulated that military partic1pation would occur 1n a single program 
directed to the development of an ALR type aircraft; that two manufacturers 
would produce the total number of units required, commercial plus military, 
but only one of these would produce the military units wlth both realizing a 
15 percent ROI; that the military would provide half of the required research, 
development and test funding (RD&T) and would subsequently purchase a number 
of un1ts equal to 25 percent of the commercial buy for the u.S. Domestic and 
u.S. International fleet; and that the weight and performance of the commercial 
version would not be penalized for military requlrements. 
Military participation lowered the unlt price about 48 percent and made 
a dramatic improvement in the economic attractiveness of the dedicated freighter 
program. Although the preferred payload size of the long range aircraft, ALR, 
remained at 68 tonnes (75 tons), its fleet economics were substantially improved. 
The a1rline ROI for the ALR was 6.4 percentage points greater and the requ1red 
fleet investment 31 percent less than the reference fleet of A2, A3, SRD and 
LRD a1rcraft. The borderline ALR2 program showed similar improvements develop-
1ng an ROJ that was 5.6 percentage points greater while requiring an investment 
27 percent smaller than the reference fleet. These economic improvements were 
primarily due to sharing the RD&T costs since the military buy was relatively 
small amounting to 43 of the 149.7 tonne (165 ton) ALR2 aircraft. Fifty percent 
subsidy of the RD&T costs, whether by the military or some other agency, would 
make the dedicated freighter program economically feasible for payloads well 
above the aircraft size limltations imposed by many major existing alrports. 
This flexib1lity 1n aircraft size indicates that the underlying economics may 
have suffic1ent lat1tude to accommodate some degradations 1n weight and/or 
performance due to the compromises necessary to meet military requirements. 
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However, the comprom1se problem has no easy solution because the answer does 
not rest with the individual examination of design features and penalties but 
1n the accumulatlve and lnterrelated impacts of all necessary configuration 
changes. 
Variation of aircraft configuration. - In a study of this type there is 
always the question as to the relative effectiveness of configurations that 
depart from the conventlonal. To answer this question two propfan powered 
aircraft, Propfan 1 and Propfan 2, illustrated in F1gure 5-8; a turbofan powered 
Spanloader (distributed payload), illustrated in Figure 5-9; and a conventional 
turbofan powered aircraft (Flgure 5-5) equipped with laminar flow control (LFC), 
were evaluated. These configurations were slzed equal to and were compared to 
the 149.7 tonne (165 ton) payload ALR2 and a 235.8 tonne (260 ton) payload ALR3• 
There was no attempt to economically determine their preferred size as done for 
the conventional aircraft. All configurations utilized 1990 technology which 
provided the incremental changes in design parameters presented below based 
upon the respective values for the conventional, advanced turbofan type 
aircraft. 
1990 TECHNOLOGY PARAMETRIC AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION 
Incremental ChanJes RelatlVe to Contemporar Alrcraft 
Mfg. Cost Acft Configuration M t.Wp+N t.WSTRU t.L/D t.SFC t.WENG t.CLTO Maint. t.SW Acft Eng. Cost 
Propfan 1 0.8 -7% -4% -10% -20% +112% +29% -10% 
Propfan 2 0.7 -11% -26% -6% -30% +103% +29% -14% 
Spanloader 0.75 -17.6% -43% -13% -4% -15% +10% 
LFC 0.85 +6.5% +22% +2% +2% -13% +4% +10% +8% 
Util1z1ng the preceding lmprovements in technology, the trlp cost for each 
type aircraft was determined. Each of the parametric aircraft were then 
competed agalnst the reference fleet of A2, A3, SRD and LRD aircraft to deflne 
the respective number of unlts required and subsequently the aircraft price. 
The latter values were based upon two manufacturers each realizlng a 15 percent 
ROI. The ALR3 was the hlghest priced aircraft of the considered conflgurations 
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Figure 5-8. Conventional Propfan Conflguration 
Figure 5-9. Distributed Load (Span Loader) Conflguration 
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and the lowest priced aircraft was the Span loader which also had the highest 
trip cost per unit payload. The lowest trip cost was provided by the LFC 
configuration. Although such comparisons are interesting, the fleet econom1CS 
developed by each of the respective configurations is the true determ1nate of 
their relative worth. 
Results of the compe~itive economic analysis of the non-convent10nal air-
craft configurations are presented 1n Figure 5-10 along with comparable data 
for some conventional configurations prevlously discussed. In splte of lts 
hlgher trip cost the Spanloader provided an airline ROI and required a fleet 
investment nearly equal to the values for the ASRjALR combination. Past analysis 
has shown the 235.8 tonne (260 ton) payload Spanloader to be near the minimum 
Slze at which this concept can equal or exceed the effectiveness of a comparable 
conventional a1rcraft. While the M=0.7 Propfan 2 showed improvement over the 
conventional ALR2 it requlred an investment 3.5 percent greater than the 
reference fleet. The M=0.8 Propfan 1, ALR3, and LFC were considered undesirable 
program candidates based upon the decreased ROI and increased investment WhlCh 
they incurred. 
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Figure 5-10. Economic Worth of Considered Configurations 
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The impact of military partic1pat10n (MP), or RD&T subsidy, is also shown 
1n Figure 5-10. Such combined commercial/m1litary program could bring payloads 
up to 544.2 tonnes (600 tons) within the relm of economic feasib1lity. Not1ng 
the relative magn1tude of the economic improvement of the ALR 2-MP over the 
ALR2 indicates that MP in either the Spanloader or Propfan 2 program could 
make it economically desirable to the airlines. However, such favorable situa-
tion could be negated by other considerations such as a1rport compatibility 
previously discussed. A second consideration involves the CAB and ICAO noise 
suppression requ1rements. Above takeoff gross weights (TOGW) of about 385.5 
tonne (425 ton), comparable to a payload of about 118 tonne (130 ton) for 
conventional a1rcraft, the noise certification requirement is constant and 
applicable to aircraft having four or less engines. Since the required thrust 
and/or number of engines increases w1th TOGW there will be an upper limit on 
aircraft size determined by the level of development of the qU1et engines. 
A third consideration is based upon the fact that the airways are now keyed 
to cruise speeds of 0.8 to 0.85 Mach number. The introduction of a slower 
Mach 0.7 a1rcraft (irrespective of the type of powerplant) on prime routes 
could cause difficulties although the 1mplementation of the expected advanced 
traffic control system should eleviate the problems that arise. 
The fleet mixes that result with the more prom1sing configurations are 
presented 1n F1gure 5-11. Due to its payload size, the Spanloader reduces the 
number of dedicated freighter aircraft required by 2008 by 75 percent compared 
to the ASR/ALR combination. While this is favorable to the airport congestion 
problem, reducing the departure frequency growth to 5.2 percent annually, the 
small number of un1ts requ1red, 392, 1S responsible for the Spanloaders 
relatively higher price in spite of 1ts design features that lower the manu-
facturing cost. Although it had the same payload, there were 13 percent more 
Propfan 2 units required than ALR2's due to the reduced block speed resulting 
from the Mach 0.7 cruise. 
The results presented in this section sUbstantiate the conclusion that 
bigger is not necessar1ly better and that lower trip cost is not a suff1cient 
criterion upon which to select a preferred new freighter aircraft size or 
configuration for development. Of equal or more importance are the aircraft 
manufacturer's and airlines ROI as affected by the size and number of aircraft 
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Figure 5-11. Conf1gurat1on Changes - 1978 to 2008 Fleet Mix Summary 
required. While small payloads can be economically preferred over large pay-
loads they pose operational problems such as large increases 1n operational 
frequency. On the other hand, large payloads offer operational advantages but 
at a possible economic penalty to the a1rline in spite of their reduced trip 
cost. These relat10nships compound the problems of defining the requirements 
for a future dedica~ed freighter aircraft. 
Future work. - Results of the CLASS show that while the 1985 derivative 
cargo aircraft program was clearly desirable, the 1995 ded1cated freighter 
program was economically marginal. These data showed program des1rability to 
be a function of aircraft size and production as affected by the cargo market 
demand, operational frequency, airline and manufacturers economics, and RD&T 
subsidy. However, many of the related and/or affect1ng issues, such as military 
participation and energy, were not fully addressed or ignored due to available 
study resources. The more important of these shorted issues are ident1fied 
below but not in order of considered importance. 
• An advanced, 1990 technology, passenger aircraft modified for cargo 
operations to compete with the 1985 derivative aircraft. 
• The effect of fleet energy consumption considering fuel availability 
in addition to the fuel cost considered in the CLASS. 
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• Detailed investigation of the impact of future airport operational 
capacities both domestic and international. 
• The impact of military versus civil freighter requirements on airline 
fleet economics and aircraft size considerlng both airline and 
manufacturers ROI. 
• The relative importance of technologlcal developments as determined 
by alrline fleet economics. 
• The preferred payload size of the Spanloader and M=O.7 Propfan 2 
configurations based upon fleet economics. 
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